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Abstract: This review, of the understanding of quantum
mechanics, is broad in scope, and aims to reflect enough
of the literature to be representative of the current state
of the subject. To enhance clarity, the main findings are
presented in the form of a coherent synthesis of the re-
viewed sources. The review highlights core characteris-
tics of quantum mechanics. One is statistical balance in
the collective response of an ensemble of identically pre-
pared systems, to differing measurement types. Another
is that states are mathematical terms prescribing prob-
ability aspects of future events, relating to an ensem-
ble of systems, in various situations. These characteris-
tics then yield helpful insights on entanglement, mea-
surement, and widely-discussed experiments and analy-
ses. The review concludes by considering how these in-
sights are supported, illustrated and developed by some
specific approaches to understanding quantum mechan-
ics. The review uses non-mathematical language precisely
(terms defined) and rigorously (consistent meanings), and
uses only such language. A theory more descriptive of in-
dependent reality than is quantum mechanics may yet be
possible. One step in the pursuit of such a theory is to
reach greater consensus on how to understand quantum
mechanics. This review aims to contribute to achieving
that greater consensus, and so to that pursuit.
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1 Introduction and context
1.1 Review subject: the challenge of
understanding quantum mechanics
Understanding quantummechanics is hard in six ways.
1. Quantummechanics involves precise mathematical
language and structure (the formalisms), but there
is no consensus (a) on whether or not quantum me-
chanics must also involve interpretation; nor (b) on
whether or not any such interpretation should lead
to understanding. For some, the predictive power of
quantum mechanics, allowing its use in practice, is
all that matters. Others look either for a way of un-
derstanding the principles of quantum mechanics,
or for what they might reveal about the world [1–9].
2. The controversy over interpretation is partly be-
cause many of our intuitions and concepts, and the
non-mathematical language describing them, devel-
oped prior to the exploration of subatomic phenom-
ena [10, 11]. In this sense, some familiar concepts
and word meanings are pre-quantum mechanical,
andmight need to bemodified [12, 13]. Quantumme-
chanics uses agreed mathematical language to ana-
lyze phenomena. There is, however, no agreement
on a corresponding non-mathematical language to
describe such phenomena [10, 14–19].
3. Some words used in writings on quantum mechan-
ics can take a variety of meanings. Authors often do
not make clear which meaning is intended. Any im-
precision, in using non-mathematical language, can
make understanding quantum mechanics harder
than it needs to be.
4. There are many approaches to understanding quan-
tummechanics [20]. No approach has yet convinced
the majority of physicists [21]. Many approaches
highlight areas where further work is needed, if we
are to reachgreater consensusonhow tounderstand
quantummechanics. For example, wemight need to
challengepre-quantummechanical concepts and in-
tuition, or to use non-mathematical language with
more precision and rigour.
5. The frequent failure to undertake a full analysis
of a realistic measurement apparatus suggests that
at least some consider it unnecessary and avoid-
able. Others undertake complexwork to realistically
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model laboratory experiments [22, § 1.9.1], which can
restrict the need for interpretative assumptions [23].
6. Underlying intellectual prejudices will very often af-
fect how quantum mechanics is discussed [19][24,
§ 23.4][25, § 4.1][26–28]. Given the potential need
to modify pre-quantum mechanical concepts and
word meanings, it is important to consider what
these prejudicesmight be, and tomake assumptions
explicit [11, § VI][29][30, pp. 16-18][31, pp. 6-8].
1.2 Review scope: understanding the theory
rather than the phenomena
Work on the foundations of physics (whether by physi-
cists or philosophers) shares some of the features of wider
philosophy of physics [32, § 1(ii,iv)][33]. These include [29,
§ 2][32, § 1]: (a) going beyond the purely mathematical con-
tent of theories; (b) clarifying the meaning of central con-
cepts; (c) examining conceptual ambiguities or inconsis-
tencies; and (d) evaluating suitable ontologies. The scope
of this review reflects these features.
What does it mean to understand quantum mechan-
ics? There is no consensus on how to answer this ques-
tion [34], but there are several useful approaches. One im-
portant distinction is between understanding phenomena
and understanding theories [35][36, § 3.2]. On this point,
some distinguish between (a) explanatory understanding
of a phenomenon (relating the phenomenon to accepted
items of knowledge) and (b) pragmatic understanding of
a theory (being able to use the theory) [37, chs. 2, 4]. Prag-
matic understanding of a theory is seen by some as neces-
sary for explanatory understanding of a phenomenon [37,
ch. 4].
One sufficient criterion for pragmatic understanding
(of a theory) is an ability to recognize characteristic qual-
itative consequences of a theory without performing ex-
act calculations. Such understanding depends on a per-
son’s capacities, knowledge and beliefs [38–40]. This ap-
proach to understanding appears relative (varying from
person to person), but an objective approach is possible
[41, § 4]. For example, understanding can be defined by
reference to values and concepts shared widely among sci-
entists (but need not necessarily coincide with truth or
knowledge) [42–44]. Understanding involves explanatory
relationships within a single theory [45], connecting the-
ories through concepts which they have in common [46],
and fitting theories into an overall framework or structure
[47].
This review reflects these views of understanding.
It focuses on the understanding of quantum mechan-
ics as a theory, rather than the understanding of the phe-
nomena which gave rise to that theory. Indeed the review
finds in the literature little, if any, agreement on how to
understand the phenomena. In contrast, the review finds
large areas of agreement on how to understand the theory.
The review identifies qualitative characteristics of quan-
tum mechanics, using concepts which are shared widely
among scientists, and which quantum mechanics shares
with other scientific theories.
1.3 Review aims: comprehensive coverage,
precise non-mathematical language
There aremanybooks andarticles onvarious aspects of un-
derstanding quantummechanics. Exploring this vast liter-
ature suggests the need for a new review with two specific
features: (a) it should be comprehensive in scope, referring
to enough of the literature to be representative of the cur-
rent state of the discipline; and (b) it should be clear, con-
cise and disciplined in its presentation and its use of lan-
guage. This review aims to meet that need.
1. The review cites many sources, concentrating on
work published in the last two decades. The main
criterion used to select which sources to cite, is the
degree of conceptual clarity contributed by a source.
The main criteria used to select which insights to in-
clude are (a) the degree of agreement amongauthors
who deal with the relevant point and (b) there be-
ing few, if any, authors offering convincing counter-
arguments. The reviewgenerally reports on these cri-
teria only by exception. Where the criteria are met,
sources are cited without further comment. Where
they are not met, alternative views are noted, and
the extent of disagreement indicated. In general, the
review is cautious: it reflects only what can be said
with reasonable confidence.
2. This review concentrates on the conceptual aspects
of quantummechanics. To retain clarity in doing so,
it aims to apply the precision and rigour of math-
ematics, to the use of non-mathematical language.
The use of language in this review is disciplined:
the reviewuses onlynon-mathematical language, so
its internal coherence entirely depends on how pre-
cisely and rigorously it uses such language. The re-
view’s use of non-mathematical language is also pre-
cise (in that intended meanings of words are speci-
fied) and rigorous (in that such intended meanings
are consistent throughout the review).
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This review acknowledges that understanding quan-
tummechanics requires both (a) familiarity with themath-
ematical language of the formalisms, and (b) the use of
non-mathematical language to relate these mathematical
formalisms to the relevant physical phenomena. In the
context of quantum mechanics, non-mathematical lan-
guage is like a magnifying lens. The lens can make text
clearer to some readers. Similarly, non-mathematical lan-
guage can enhance understanding of the mathematics of
quantum mechanics, for at least some users. Such lan-
guage is not a substitute for the mathematics.
1.4 Review outline: a synthesised map: the
understanding of quantum mechanics
To further enhance clarity, the main findings of the review
are presented in the formof a coherent synthesis. The cited
sources demonstrate that the significant elements of this
non-mathematical synthesis are consistent with the cor-
responding mathematics. Areas of disagreement, such as
those outlined in Sect. 1.1 above, limit the extent to which
the synthesis can be comprehensive: it is not always possi-
ble to synthesize apparently differing views.
The remainder of this Part 1 clarifies how this review
and synthesis relate to wider discussions on the themes
of reality, spacetime, probability and determinism. It aims
only to explicitly clarify (a) the assumptions underlying
this review and synthesis, and (b) the intended meanings
of ambiguous terms. With that limited aim, brief reference
ismade to the literature to indicate that these assumptions
and meanings are at least reasonable.
The next five parts set out the main findings of the re-
view, using non-mathematical language in a precise way,
and using only such language. Part 2 identifies statistical
balance as a core characteristic of quantum mechanics.
Part 3 highlights characteristics of quantum mechanical
states. Part 4 uses these characteristics to review the is-
sues of measurement, decoherence and uncertainty. Part
5 uses the insights from Parts 2, 3 and 4 to review some
widely-discussed experiments, thought experiments and
other analyses. Part 6 reviews some specific approaches to
understanding quantum mechanics. It also notes how in-
sights and perspectives from earlier parts are supported,
illustrated, or developed by some such approaches.
The main findings of the review are summarized in
Part 7. Part 8 is a glossary of intended meanings for many
elements of the non-mathematical language used.
The review is, to the vast literature it reviews, what a
map is to the territory it represents. It is necessarily con-
cise and schematic. It can be read in isolation, but will
be better appreciated when exploring the mapped terri-
tory. It is aimed at both (a) those who are new to the ter-
ritory (and so need help to find their way around) and (b)
those who know the territory well (for whom the map may
highlight previously unnoticed aspects of, or connections
within, the territory).
The glossary in Part 8 is as essential to this review
and synthesis, as the legend is to a map. Different maps
may use the same symbol to represent different features.
In the same way, the intended meaning of elements of the
non-mathematical languageused in this review,maydiffer
from the meanings intended by other authors, when they
use the same words.
1.5 Moderate realism: physics might be able
to describe independent reality
There are many shades of meaning within the concept of
realism. Central to most of these is the concept of mind-
independent reality [30, ch. 9][48, 49][50, ch. 2][51]. The
phrasemind-independent reality, or simply independent re-
ality, indicates a reality which exists other than only in hu-
man thought.
Idealism argues that mind-independent reality does
not exist; in other words, only ideas in minds exist. A less
extreme view is that of instrumentalism,which argues that
science aims only for empirically adequate theories, and
that notions, such as independent reality, which cannot
be defined operationally have no scientific meaning,
Idealism and instrumentalism are not necessarily any
more reasonable or scientific than the view that indepen-
dent reality exists [22, § 2.3][30][52], andmay in fact be less
so.
– An independent reality might be the source of inter-
subjective agreement (between observers) [53].
– Belief in an independent reality can motivate scien-
tific pursuit and explain its progress [54, § 6].
– The structure in empirical data in quantummechan-
ics also seems to require explanation in terms of in-
dependent reality [55].
One use of the word realism is to express the view that
the notion of independent reality is meaningful. This has
been termed open realism [49], metaphysical realism [50,
pp. 35–37][56, § 4.2.1], or ontic realism [22, § 2.3].
This open realism may be based on the idea that the-
ories have to pass the test of experiment. It is hard to be-
lieve that experimental results reflect nothing other than
processes and interactions within our minds [49]. Open re-
alism is, however, careful to distinguish, in principle, be-
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tween (a) mind-independent reality (the world as it is) and
(b) the phenomena (the world as perceived by our minds)
[36, § 3.2]. This distinction results in open realism having
two broad forms [49, § 4].
– One form considers that independent reality is un-
available for direct investigation (or veiled). On this
view, physics only describes and analyzes phenom-
ena. The extent to which physics might reveal fea-
tures of independent reality is unknown [30, pp. 171,
174].
– Another form is known as physical,mathematical or
scientific realism. It assumes that physics can aspire
to describe, or in fact dealswith, independent reality
directly [30, part II][51, 57].
Whatever view is taken of realism in the broader con-
text of science, or even physics in general, it is worth con-
sidering realism in a specific context [52, 58, 59]. Here the
question is: canwe understand quantummechanics in the
context of a wider, mind-independent reality (in the sense
mentioned above)? Some suggest that the features of quan-
tummechanics are such that it may not be tenable to hold
to physical realism [30][49, § 4][60]. This review finds that
it is not yet fully clear that such a view is warranted. In
the meantime, it appears to be worth pursuing the possi-
bility that physics might be able to describe independent
reality[54, 61][62, § 2.5][63–65].
This review contributes to that pursuit, which reflects
a form of open realism which has been calledmoderate re-
alism [66] or pragmatist realism [67].
1.6 Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics:
time as independent from space
There are two major views on spacetime. Substantivalism
holds that spacetime exists independently of matter. Rela-
tionism holds that facts about spacetime reduce to facts
about matter: spacetime is only a human conceptual tool
to describe phenomena [68–70]. These views can be com-
bined with other approaches such as eternalism or presen-
tism. In eternalism, or block universe, present, past, and
future all equally exist in an unchanging spacetime. In pre-
sentism only the present is real [71]. Deciding on the best
metaphysical approach to spacetime may depend on the
specific context [72].
It is not clear which, if any, of these approaches is best
suited to quantummechanics [68, 71], in which themathe-
matical formalisms neither depend on, nor necessarily in-
volve, the concept of spacetime [68]. The formalisms are
used to analyze phenomena, taken to relate to physical
systems, and these phenomena and systems are often de-
scribed by reference to a spacetime background [71, 73].
In physics, spacetime is treated in three distinct ways:
(i) in a nonrelativistic approach, time is treated as indepen-
dent of space, (ii) special relativity treats time and space as
interacting in spacetime, and (iii) general relativity treats
spacetime as dynamically interacting with mass. Each of
these three has a quantum counterpart.
1. It is sometimes appropriate to use nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics, which treats time as inde-
pendent of space. This quantum mechanics can
be viewed as an approximation, valid in a limited
regime, to a more fundamental theory [74, 75].
2. In other contexts phenomena and systems are
treated in an integrated spacetime background. The
main approach is relativistic quantum field theory,
a group of effective theories which, again, can be
thought of as approximate [76, 77].
3. General relativity has not yet been integrated with
quantum theory. This might require one, or both, of
them to be modified, or better understood [78–80].
For example, it might be that neither time nor space
is continuous [79, 81–84].
Consideration of quantum field theory may shed light
on some of the problems of understanding nonrelativis-
tic quantum mechanics [74, 75, 85, 86], but has not yet re-
solved them. Indeednew foundational questions arise (see
Sect. 5.8 below).
One test of the adequacy of any understanding of
quantum mechanics, is the extent to which it is possible
to apply and make sense of that understanding in quan-
tum theory more widely, for example in quantum field the-
ory [87]. This review focuses on (nonrelativistic) quantum
mechanics. Its findings should, therefore, be taken as pro-
visional in this respect.
In quantum mechanics the treatment of time is not
fully resolved [88–96].
– Time is generally treated very differently from space.
– Time can either be measured by a clock external to
the relevant systems, or it canbedefined through the
dynamical behaviour of those systems.
– Time can also be considered as an observable (al-
though views differ on this [97–101]).
This review deals with nonrelativistic quantum me-
chanics in a way that is independent of which philosoph-
ical approach to spacetime is used as a basis for dealing
with the relevant phenomena, and independent of the ap-
proach to time in nonrelativistic quantummechanics.
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1.7 Understanding probability: differing
approaches, no consensus
The interpretation of probability in general is controver-
sial. In general, probability analyzes uncertainty. Depend-
ing on which approach is taken to probability, the uncer-
tainty is considered to be either (a) epistemic, an aspect of
theories about nature (for example, reflecting ignorance),
or (b) ontological, an aspect of nature itself (perhaps re-
flecting indeterminism).
Within each of these broad approaches, views differ
on how to understand probability [102, § 8.2].
– The epistemic sense of probability can be viewed
as one or more of subjective, logical (determined
by the information available) [103, § 4], personalist
(varying from person to person) [103, § 2], or plural-
ist (common to groups of people, or intersubjective)
[104].
– The ontological sense can be viewed in terms of fre-
quencies [105, 106], stochastic or deterministic dy-
namics [105, 107], the Humean mosaic (facts in the
world) [105–107], propensities (single-case or long-
run) [105, 106], or features of theories [106, 108].
Drawing clear distinctions between these differing ap-
proaches to, and views of, probability is, at best, challeng-
ing [104, 109, 110]. For example, Bayesian approaches, in
general, treat probabilities as tools for making decisions
based on incomplete information. Specific Bayesian ap-
proaches differ in emphasis: between subjective and ob-
jective [111], and among personalist [112, § III], logical [113]
and frequentist [114]. It is unlikely that any single view of
probability will apply in all contexts [115].
There are challenges within the relative frequency ap-
proach [109][111, § 4][115–117].
– Probabilities are defined by reference to the re-
sults of repeated experiments on a large number of
identically-prepared systems.
– This seems to make the statistics of probability dis-
tributions purely empirical and objective but it de-
pends on prior probabilistic assumptions: one can-
not get a probable from an is.
The propensity approach was reintroduced precisely
to deal with probabilities in quantummechanics [118]. All
propensity views attribute a disposition to unpredictable
systems which is quantified by objective probabilities at-
tributed to such systems. This disposition is viewed as
an aspect of independent reality [106, 119]. Some views
treat propensity as only a basis for an ontology, to be com-
bined with another approach to probability, either objec-
tive [115, 120], or epistemic [121]. It is not yet clear whether
or not challenges arising in the propensity approach can
be satisfactorily resolved [110, 122][123, § 5].
This review treats quantummechanics in a way that is
independent of the approach taken to understandingprob-
ability.
1.8 Using probability: a classical approach
to quantum mechanical data
Probabilistic and statistical data in quantum mechanics
can be fully analyzed in the framework of classical prob-
ability and statistics [124, § 8][125, 126].
– The probabilistic structure of data arising in classi-
cal physics theory represents a special case of classi-
cal probability theory, but
– the probabilistic structure of data in quantum me-
chanics represents a more general structure of clas-
sical probability theory.
There is inconsistency in how authors use the term
“classical probability theory”. This review follows those
[124] who use “classical probability theory” to refer to the
structure of probabilistic data common to quantum me-
chanics and classical physics. Others [125, 127] also high-
light the structure of probabilistic data common to quan-
tum mechanics and classical physics, but use “classical
probability theory” to refer to the specific structure of prob-
abilistic data unique to classical physics.
Kolmogorov’s formulation of (classical) probability
theory provides a rigorous base for calculations [117, 128].
It does not explain the physical nature of the probability
measure [129]. Kolmogorov emphasised that no probabil-
ity is unrelated to experimental context: each such context
generates its own probability space [130–132]. This high-
lights that all probability statements are intrinsically (of-
ten implicitly) conditional [105, 115, 128, 130].
Probabilities in quantum mechanics can be analyzed
in a Kolmogorovmodel as conditional probabilities, in any
one of at least three ways:
1. by conditioning on detection [133]; or
2. by allowing for differences among runs of the same
measurement [134]; or
3. by conditioning on experimental settings [130, 135].
Conditioning on experimental settings [135] acknowledges
that probabilities in general reflect two elements of ran-
domness: that of state preparation, and that of experimen-
tal settings. It reveals that probabilities in quantum me-
chanics reflect only randomness of state preparation. This
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might mean that any two random variables recorded un-
der mutually exclusive conditions should, by default, use
different sample spaces [131, 136].
1.9 Limits to determinism: not necessarily
limits to understanding
In general, quantum mechanics does not predict the out-
come of individual measurement events. At first sight this
feature appears to be inconsistent with the so-called deter-
minism of classical physics. This raises four questions.
1. What is meant by determinism?
2. Is determinism a feature of classical physics?
3. Is indeterminism a feature of quantummechanics?
4. Is determinism inconsistent with free will?
There are no simple answers to these questions.
1. There is no single agreed definition of determinism
[137]. This review will take determinism to imply
that any possible group of systems (which are iso-
lated from any other systems) will evolve in a sin-
gle unique way from any possible initial conditions
[138].
Indeterminism is the absence of determinism.
This reviewwill classify each of determinism and in-
determinsim as being either ontological (a feature of
independent reality) or epistemic (a feature of our
knowledge of independent reality).
2. Classical mechanics involves epistemic indetermin-
ism. It is impossible to be certain of the precise po-
sition of a particle [139]. It is also impossible to be
certain about any physical law [77]. Physics theories
identify systems which can be treated as isolated,
and laws describing how such systems evolve from
initial conditions. Such theories have limited preci-
sion [77]:
– no system can be fully isolated and,
– for the known universe, the role of laws can-
not be separated from that of initial condi-
tions.
Ontological determinismmay, in principle, underlie
epistemic indeterminism [140, § 4][141]. The basis for
ontological determinism in classical mechanics can,
however, also be challenged [77, § 5.5].
– Applying a simple law can generate unpre-
dictable behaviour [142], so determinism does
not necessarily imply predictability [24, ch.
12][110][143].
– There are also limits, in principle, within clas-
sical physics itself, to its analysis of situations
to which it is commonly applied [137, 144, 145].
– Moreover, even in classical physics there is
also a limit, in principle, to the precision with
which initial conditions can be specified [146,
147].
It is therefore unclear what distinguishes ontologi-
cal determinism. Classical physics, even in princi-
ple, involves uncertainty [139].
3. There is complete consensus that quantummechan-
ics involves, in principle, an indeterminismwhich is,
at least, epistemic. Less widely acknowledged is its
epistemic indeterminism in practice.
– Quantum mechanical analysis requires the
calculation of solutions to the Schrödinger
equation.
– For complex systems, this might not be possi-
ble [148] [149, § 6].
Again, however, epistemic indeterminism is not nec-
essarily inconsistent with some form of underlying
ontological determinism [22, § 4.2.3][110, 150][151,
§ 5](Sects. 6.2, 6.3 and 6.7 below).
4. Establishingany relationship, betweendeterminism
and free will, depends on how each term is defined
[137, 152–154], and on the context in which any po-
tential link is considered [155].
Fundamental ontological determinism would not
necessarily conflictwith practical epistemic freewill
(freedom to choose an initial state, regardless of its
past, to check its future evolution) [156, § 3][157].
– It is hard to argue for more than such epis-
temic free will, assuming that some form of
law is in operation.Whether or not laws arede-
terministic or indeterministic, to modify our
actionswillmodify our possible pasts (as even
indeterministic laws fix objective probabili-
ties) [158, § 5].
– Apparently free choices are, therefore, in prin-
ciple, linked to past events [157][159, § 3.8], al-
though it is hard to see how, in practice, the ex-
istence of any such link could be established
[160].
– It is also true that the result of a determinis-
tic evolution cannot necessarily be foreseen
[138][159, § 5.5].
Thus it may be more reasonable to believe that free
will is practical and epistemic only, rather than ab-
solute and unconstrained.
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There is ongoing debate on whether or not quantum
mechanics is relevant to free will [156–159, 161].
This review treats quantum mechanics in a way that is (a)
independent of whether independent reality is determinis-
tic or indeterministic; and (b) independent of whether any
indeterminism is ontological or epistemic.
2 A core quantum characteristic:
prescribed statistical balance
2.1 Quantum mechanics: prescribing
regularities among events
There is widespread agreement that quantum mechanics
prescribes (specifies in advance) some aspects of expected
future events relating to physical systems, in a range of
possible situations [162][163, § 4.5]. Prescriptions (advance
specifications) are made, collectively, as probability dis-
tributions. Understanding quantummechanics, therefore,
involves some of the challenges of understanding proba-
bility (see Sect. 1.7 above).
There is also widespread agreement that verifying the
prescriptions of quantum mechanics is almost always sta-
tistical [22, § 4.2.3, § 6.4][164][165, ch. 9][166–168][169, pp.
206, 210][170, p. 99].
– Quantum mechanics does prescribe individual
events in the limited sense of not ruling them out
[171, § 6.2].
– It also sometimes prescribes probabilities of 1 or
0, which precisely prescribe individual events [172,
§ II.F][173, p. 20].
– In general, however, quantummechanics prescribes
only regularities among multiple events.
All the prescriptions of quantum mechanics are in
terms of events. In this review event is taken to mean the
instantiation of one ormore properties within some region
of spacetime [174, § 2]. The prominence of events in quan-
tummechanics has prompted some to explore the possibil-
ity that events, rather than systems, form the fundamental
ontology of independent reality [2, 174][175, § 10.2][176].
– Such an approach does not necessarily rule out the
usefulness of the concept of a system in understand-
ing quantummechanics.
– It does, however, highlight the possibility that such
systems may be comprised of discrete events, rather
than having a continuous existence.
– This review, in using the term system, intends to im-
plicitly acknowledge that possibility. Where appro-
priate, the possibility will be explicitly highlighted.
That said, there are others who argue against an event
based ontology, on the grounds both of its inconsistency
with the corresponding formalisms and of its apparent de-
pendence on assumptions about spacetime [177, § 2].
Among other events, quantum mechanics frequently
prescribes the outcomes of system-apparatus interactions.
For situations involving interaction with an apparatus in a
measurement, the probability distributions can be verified
using an ensemble of identically prepared systems [178, pp.
55-56][179, § 6.2, § 6.3].
– In such situations, the probability distribution char-
acterizes measurement events collectively. In each
such event, system and apparatus are combined
[180].
– By analogy, the distribution characterizes spinning
a specific coin with a specific spinning device [181,
182].
Thus, even if there are continually existing physi-
cal systems, quantum mechanics does not necessarily de-
scribe intrinsic features of such systems in isolation.
2.2 Statistical balance in quantum
mechanics: prescribed, not explained
Some features of the prescriptions of quantum mechan-
ics raise a significant challenge to understanding. For
any given measurement type, in a series of measurement
events, the outcomes (collectively) give statistics consis-
tent with the prescribed probability. This feature is com-
mon in contexts to which probability is applied. The un-
usual feature of quantummechanics is that, for some com-
binations ofmeasurement types, the observed statistics in-
dicate that the collective response of (what are taken to
be) identically prepared systems to differingmeasurement
types is not at all straightforward.
– This can be seen in an ensemble prepared so that
the prescribed probability for a given outcome in a
particular measurement type is 1 [183, § 8][184, § 2].
– Typically, empirical data for a second measurement
type on that same ensemble are consistent with a
prescribed probability other than 0 or 1 (differing
outcomes in repeated runs of the second measure-
ment).
– A claim that eachmember of the ensemble was, orig-
inally, such that a definite value could be attributed
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to the second measured property, is inconsistent
with the fact that the prescribed probability for a
given outcome in the first measurement type is 1.
– This can be seen by subjecting each member of the
prepared ensemble to a sequence of measurement
events: type two and then type one [56, § 1.1.2].
– The type two measurement effectively prepares two
new ensembles: in each, the prescribed probability
for a given outcome in a type two measurement is 1.
– When the type one measurement is then made on
each of these ensembles, the results are consistent
with a prescribed probability other than 0 or 1, and
so inconsistent with the prescribed probabilities for
the originally prepared ensemble.
– On this basis, it appears that no definite value of
the second property can be attributed to individual
members of the originally prepared ensemble.
– It is, therefore, remarkable that the statistics of the
collective outcomes of the type two measurement
are balanced to be consistentwith a prescribed prob-
ability which is neither 0 nor 1.
In this review, the phrase statistical balance refers to
this intricately balanced collective response, to differing
measurement types, as reflected in prescribed probabili-
ties and empirical data [185, Part 3]. This statistical bal-
ance features even in the analysis of events treated as relat-
ing to systems which are single (no subsystems) and sim-
ple (no structure) [183, § 8][184, § 2][186, § 4]. It has been
suggested that this is one of the fundamental features of
quantummechanics [184][185, Part 3][186], but it is seldom
highlighted [184], except for widely-extended composite
systems (see Sects. 3.6 and 5.2 to 5.6 below).
There seems to be a widespread, implicit acceptance
that explaining this balance is not part of quantum me-
chanics [184, 186]. There are, however, some attempts to
identify the source of this balance.
– The statistical balance may be seen as a new law of
nature [185, Part 3].
– The balance may reflect some other theory underly-
ing quantummechanics (see Sect. 6.7 below).
– The balance may reflect a conservation principle
which operates at the level of whole ensemble,
rather than at the level of each ensemble member
[187].
– Some approaches accept the balance as a feature of
independent reality which requires changes to some
pre-quantum mechanical concepts [123, § 6][188,
§ 8].
This review frequently refers to the statistical charac-
ter of almost all prescriptions of quantummechanics, and
to the concept of statistical balance. In doing so, the re-
view, like quantummechanics itself,
– accepts that the collective response, of an ensem-
ble of (what are taken to be) identically prepared
systems, to (separately or in combination) differing
measurement types, is balanced, but
– remains silent on the explanation or source of this
pervasive statistical balance.
3 Quantum mechanical states:
characteristics and classification
3.1 States: core features and challenges
There is ongoing disagreement on how the concept of state
in quantum mechanics should be interpreted [179, 189,
190]. There is, however, widespread (though not universal)
agreement on the following two core features of the quan-
tum mechanical state.
1. The word state refers to amathematical term (the ex-
act form depends on the formalism used) [191, 192].
2. The state allows inference of probability distribu-
tions for collective outcomes of future measurement
processes [25, p. 65] (see Sect. 4 below): in practice it
is such data that are comparedwith prescribed prob-
abilities (see Sect. 2.1 above).
These two features raise four particular challenges.
1. What precise non-mathematical language should
we use to refer to states?
– The phrase state of the system is often used.
This is, however confusing, because the state
reflects knowledge about the ensemble, not
about any individual system [178, pp. 56-
57][193].
– The phrase knowledge about the ensemble,
however, itself raises further confusion. It im-
plies that at least one other system exists,
which somehow knows [162, § 7][172, § II.A].
– Some suggest preparation of the system as
a more appropriate term than state [30, p.
254][194, § 2.1]. This raises two difficulties: (a)
a preparation process might not operate as in-
tended [16][22, § 1.4.1][195, § 4], and (b) prepa-
ration is a challenging concept in cosmology
[50, pp. 54–57][196, § 6.1].
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– Some define a state as an equivalence class
of preparation processes (a class of processes
which produce ensembles of systems which
cannot be distinguished by experiment) [8, p.
92][22, § 1.1][189, § 10.2][196, § 11.5][197, § 13.2].
2. How does the concept of state apply to closed sys-
tems?
– In theory, the Schrödinger equation applies to
such systems [198, § 1].
– In practice, we cannot make external mea-
surements on some closed systems, such as
those which contain our solar system [172,
§ II.A][199].
3. How does the concept of state relate to sponta-
neous events (not triggered by measurement) [200–
202]? Quantum mechanics should apply to sponta-
neous transitions like radioactive decay, passively
recorded [202]. Quantummechanics should also ap-
ply to unobserved transitions such as those in the
earth’s core, or in space [203, p. xiii].
4. Does a state always, necessarily, relate to an ensem-
ble, rather than a single system [204, § 1][205, p.
228]?
– It is, usually, not possible to determine an un-
known state by investigating a single system.
Such determination may, however, be possi-
ble in particular cases [173, pp. 20-23][206].
– As noted in Sect. 2.1 above, quantummechan-
ics can prescribe some individual measure-
ment events in a limitedway and others rarely.
3.2 States: a comprehensive, synthesized,
non-mathematical characterization
Taking all this into account, suggests the following care-
ful, comprehensive, non-mathematical characterizationof
a quantummechanical state, achieved by a synthesis of el-
ements of several analyses [162, § 7][163, 164, 176, 193, 207]
of the concept.
– In quantum mechanics, a state is a mathematical
term containing the following probabilistic informa-
tion relating to a physical system.
– The state prescribes, generally in terms of
probability distributions, aspects of expected
future events relating to a statistical ensemble
of such systems, in a range of possible situa-
tions.
– These situations may include the systems re-
maining closed, and may also include the sys-
tems interacting with other systems.
– Interactions may be with an apparatus (in
a measurement process) or with an environ-
ment (even without such a process).
– For measurement, the state prescribes, for
each type, probability distributions (for out-
comesof repeatedmeasurement events of that
type on an ensemble of systems) reflecting
a statistical balance in collective outcomes,
both within ensembles, and among ensem-
bles for differing measurement types.
– In this limited context, some states represent
an equivalence class of preparations.
The above characterization is not limited by the con-
cepts of measurement, preparation or knowledge. This
characterization can therefore, in principle, apply to sys-
tems which are not observed. (Whether or not it is possi-
ble in practice to determine the state of such a system is a
different matter.)
The above characterization refers to probabilities and
ensembles but unusual cases can be accommodated by
(a) noting that in some cases the relevant probability can
equal 1, and (b) allowing in some cases for the ensemble to
have only one physical member and many mental copies.
3.3 Using subensembles to distinguish pure
states from mixed states
There is some variation among authors on the subject of
pure states. Some reserve the term stateonly for pure states
while others allow states to be either pure or mixed [204,
§ 1]. This review takes the term state to cover both pure
states and mixed states, and distinguishes between the
two in terms of subensembles of the relevant ensemble.
A pure state is a state for which the relevant ensemble
is such that any subensemble of that ensemble is also rep-
resented by that same state [193][205, § 2]. Thus, if the pure
state ensemble is divided into subensembles, expectation
values of all dynamical variables for any subensemble
equal those for the original ensemble, and those for all the
other subensembles [169, p. 307][173, p. 8]. Loosely speak-
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ing, a pure state cannot be mathematically expressed as a
simple aggregate of distinct states [197, p. 7].
A mixed state is one for which the relevant ensemble
can be split in such a way that each subensemble is repre-
sented by a different pure state [193][205, § 2]. For a mixed
state, therewill bemanyways inwhich the relevant ensem-
ble can be split into subensembles represented by pure
states. This suggests that although, again speaking loosely,
a mixed state can be mathematically represented as a sim-
ple aggregate of pure states, such a representation does
not convey physical meaning, unless further information
is available [25, § 6.1][193][197, § 2.4][208]. A mixed state
can, alternatively, be called a proper mixture [179, 189].
Depending on the formalism in use, a pure state can
be represented by any one of at least three mathematical
terms: a density matrix, a vector or a wavefunction [25,
§ 6.1.1][179, § 12.1][193]. In contrast, a mixed state can only
be represented by a density matrix [179, § 12.2][193]. This
review uses the term density matrix to refer to all states,
whether pure or mixed, and does not use either of the
terms vector or wavefunction.
3.4 States: no clarity yet on any simple
relationship to independent reality
Sect. 3.1 above notes some aspects of the ongoing disagree-
ment on the concept of state. This sectionoutlines a further
area of disagreement about states.
Is the state objective or subjective? Is the state onto-
logical (an aspect of nature itself), or epistemic (an aspect
of theories about nature)? The state prescribes probability
distributions, so it is not surprising that making such dis-
tinctions unambiguous is challenging (see Sect. 1.7 above).
What can be said is that assignment of a state reflects, at
least, broad intersubjective agreement among agents, who
are assigning a state to a given physical system, on the ba-
sis of a given set of data [103, 209]. This still allows two
agents, with differing data about the same situation, to as-
sign different states to the same physical system [23, fn.
29][162].
Despite the challenges and ambiguities involved,
some authors have explored what link there might be be-
tween (a) the mathematical, quantum mechanical state,
and (b) an ontic state, taken to be part of independent re-
ality. Two broad groups of views have emerged, referred to
(loosely) as the epistemic view and the ontic view.
There are two types of epistemic view [210]. Quantum
mechanical states convey information about, or relate to,
either (a) measurement, treated as a primitive, or (b) un-
derlying physical (ontic) states. In the latter view, some-
times called a mixed model, an ontic state may relate to
more than one quantum mechanical state (each of which
may encode probabilities for more than one ontic state)
[211–214].
In the ontic view, sometimes called a segregated
model, an ontic state relates to only one quantummechan-
ical state [212]. In the simplest segregated model, each
quantum mechanical state fully specifies a single ontic
state. In other segregated models, a single quantum me-
chanical state can relate to several ontic states.
It has been suggested, subject to assumptions, that
only segregated model (ontic) theories reproduce the pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics [215]. Despite this, many
still view the quantummechanical state aswholly or partly
epistemic [213, 216, 217]. Their view is tenable given the
clear scope to reject or challenge one ormore of the explicit
or implicit assumptions [88, § 2.2][171, 214][218, § 4][219–
222]. Ongoing arguments for the ontic view [223] appear to
be similarly inconclusive [217, 224].
One challenge to any ontic view is how the mathe-
matical term representing the quantum mechanical state
relates to independent reality [192]. For example, there
are many terms in a typical density matrix. It is not ob-
vious how these many terms correspond to conventional
four-dimensional spacetime [53, 225–228]. One suggestion
is that an apparent four-dimensional spacetime emerges
from a more fundamental realm with very many more di-
mensions [229]. The quantum mechanical state can, how-
ever, be directly linked to an ontic state in conventional
spacetime [118, 230, 231]. For example, the many terms of
the typical density matrix can be taken as coefficients of
a multi-field. A field specifies properties, smoothly across
spacetime, by reference to each separate point in space-
time. A multi-field specifies properties, again smoothly
across spacetime, but by reference to multiple points in
spacetime [230, 231].
An alternative classification distinguishes between
the different parts of independent reality into which the
mathematical, quantum mechanical state is mapped. In
what is classed as an empiricist approach, the state is
mapped into the macroscopic preparation and measure-
ment apparatus (in a similar way to the first type of epis-
temic view noted above) [22, § 2.2]. The second type of epis-
temic view noted above, and the ontic view, are then to-
gether classed as realist approaches, where the mathemat-
ical state is mapped, in various ways, into microscopic on-
tic states [22, § 2.3]. Despite some clear benefits of the em-
piricist approach [22, § 2.4], the debate in recent years (be-
tween the epistemic view and the ontic view, as outlined
above) shows that it has not yet achieved widespread sup-
port.
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Overall, there do not yet appear to be clear grounds to
accept any simple relationship between the quantum me-
chanical state and independent reality.
3.5 Superpositions: combining states, not
necessarily combining systems
This section reviews a particular way in which quantum
mechanical states can be mathematically combined to
form new states. A combination of states does not neces-
sarily imply any physical combination of systems.
There is some variation among authors on the subject
of superpositions. Some reserve the term superposition
only for pure states [197, § 2.2]. Others allow superposition
states to be either pure or mixed [193]. This review takes
the term superposition to cover only pure states, and de-
fines superpositions by reference to the coefficients used
in combining states to form the superposition.
As noted in Sect. 3.3 above, speaking in loose terms,
a mixed state can be expressed as a simple aggregate of
pure states. The aggregate is simple in the sense that all
the coefficients in itsmathematical representation are real,
positive numbers [25, pp. 90-91][197, § 2.1][205, pp. 222-
223]. In contrast, a superposition state is, in both techni-
cal and loose terms, a complex combination of different
pure states. The combination is complex in the sense that
all the coefficients in its mathematical representation are
complex numbers [197, § 2.2][232, pp. 16-18]. Strictly speak-
ing the real numbers are a subset of the complex numbers,
and this may explain why some authors [193] take mixed
states to be a subset of superposition states. In this review,
however, the coefficients in the representation of a super-
position are taken to be non-real complex numbers, and
so the term superposition is restricted to combinations (of
pure states) which are themselves pure states [197, § 2.2].
The superposition state has characteristics distinct from
those of the two which combine [232, pp. 12-13].
Superposition states are pure [197, § 2.2]. As noted
in Sect. 3.3, this means that any subensemble of the rel-
evant ensemble is represented by that same state [193].
In particular, the relevant ensemble cannot be split into
subensembles in such a way that each subensemble can
be represented by one or other of the two states which
were superposed. A superposition cannot be interpreted
as suggesting that each system in the relevant ensemble
could, before any measurement, be represented by one or
other of the two superposed states [61, 233]. This can be
demonstrated both in theory and by experiment [173, pp.
10-11][186, § 4].
A pure state cannot be mathematically expressed as a
simple aggregate of twoormore states (see Sect. 3.3 above),
but it can be represented as a superposition of two ormore
pure states [123, § 4][232, p. 12]. For a pure state, there will
be many ways in which that state can be mathematically
represented as a superposition of other pure states. One or
more of these different superposition representations of a
pure state may be useful in the analysis of any given phys-
ical situation.
In common with all quantum mechanical states, a su-
perposition state prescribes, in terms of probability distri-
butions, aspects of expected future events relating to a
statistical ensemble of systems, in various situations. As
noted in Sect. 3.2, for measurement situations, the state
prescribes probabilities for each type, which reflect a sta-
tistical balance in collective outcomes, among ensembles
for differing measurement types. (The term statistical bal-
ance was introduced in Sect. 2.2 above.) Thus all states
implicitly reflect the core feature of quantum mechanics:
the collective response of identically prepared systems to
differing measurement types is statistically balanced (see
Sect. 2.2 above). In superposition states, however, this core
feature is explicitly visible in themathematical term repre-
senting the superposition state [2, § 3]. A density matrix
for a superposition state contains, not only terms repre-
senting possible measurement event outcomes, but also
extra terms representing the statistical balance between
such outcomes. The terms representing possible outcomes
can in principle be experienced in a single measurement
event, but the additional terms can only be experienced
as statistical balance between outcomes.
One demonstration of the type of statistical balance
characteristic of a superposition state, with these addi-
tional terms, is the phenomenon of interference (see Sect.
5.1 below) [165, § 9.2][234]. For this reason, the additional
terms are commonly known as interference terms, and
their existence is referred to as coherence [234].
Nothing in the above outline necessarily implies or in-
volves combinations of physical systems. The next section
reviews how it applies to such combinations.
3.6 Entanglement: statistically balanced
subsystem outcomes
When systems interact, or are considered together, any
separate states for the systems are replaced by a new one
for the composite system [183, § 15]. In theory, the compos-
ite system state could relate to an ensemble empirically
identical to the combined ensembles relevant to any states
for the combining systems. Such a composite system state
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may be pure or mixed. Typically, however, the composite
system state is a superposition of composite system pure
states, and so is an entangled state [25, p. 149]. In the-
ory, the entangled state, in commonwith all superposition
states, is pure (see Sect. 3.5 above). In practice, such purity
may be short-lived, as explored further in Part 4 below (or
may not arise at all). In the rest of this Part 3, entangled
states will be taken to be pure.
Apure entangled state, in commonwith all pure states,
is a state for which the relevant ensemble is such that any
subensemble of that ensemble is also represented by that
same entangled state (see Sect. 3.3 above). In particular,
the entangled state relates to an ensemble empirically dif-
ferent from any combination of ensembles relevant to any
states for the combining systems [189, § 7.2].
Like all quantum mechanical states, entangled states
feature a statistical balance in collective outcomes, among
ensembles for differing measurements on the ensemble to
which they relate. (The term statistical balance was intro-
duced in Sect. 2.2 above.) Three features are seen in the
statistical balance of an entangled state.
1. The statistical balance of an entangled state in-
cludes statistical balance in collective outcomes,
among ensembles for differing measurements on in-
dividual subsystems. (Like other statistical balances
specific to superposition states (see Sect. 3.5 above),
this subsystem statistical balance is reflected in spe-
cific terms (in the density matrix which represents
the entangled state) which are called interference
terms, and represents a form of coherence [235,
§ 2.3].)
2. This subsystem statistical balance includes balance
between measurement event outcomes for measure-
ments on widely-separated subsystems.
3. This subsystem statistical balance also includes sta-
tistical balance between outcomes for differingmea-
surement types on differing subsystems.
It is the combination of the latter two of these fea-
tures which leads to results which attract much attention.
Links between experimental results for distant objects are
not strange: such links arise in classical physics. Statisti-
cal balance in collective outcomes, for differing measure-
ment types, arises for even a simple system [173, pp. 10-
11][184][186, § 4]. The unique and defining feature of entan-
glement is statistical balance among collective outcomes,
for differing measurement types, on far-apart subsystems
[236]. This is considered further in Sects. 5.2 and 5.3 below.
The composite system entangled state provides proba-
bility distributions for each subsystem in the context of ex-
periments spanning the wider composite system. If states
are separately assigned to subsystems (in the context of
experiments restricted to only one subsystem), then these
subsystem states will prescribe probabilities which differ
from those prescribed by the composite system entangled
state (in the context of experiments spanning the wider
composite system). In this limited sense, entanglement
contrasts with the idea that composite systems can be ex-
plained in terms of their subsystems [25, p. 185][53, 237,
238]. The contrast is limited because, as noted above, the
state is distinct from the system [239, 240]. Some analyses
appear implicitly to reject this distinction [241].
3.7 Reduced density matrices: useful tools
for limited purposes
From a composite system state (mixed or entangled), we
can compute probability distributions, for measurement
event outcomes, for experiments restricted to only one sub-
system. This calculation uses a reduced density matrix for
the subsystem. The reduced density matrix can be mathe-
matically derived from the composite state [242].
The reduced density matrix is a coarse-graining of the
quantum mechanical state for the composite system [243].
The reduced density matrix is sometimes called an im-
propermixture [179, 189], because it ismathematically sim-
ilar to a proper mixture. (As noted in Sect. 3.3 above, a
proper mixture is an alternative term for a mixed state.)
The reduced density matrix is, however, (in relation to the
wider composite system) not a quantum mechanical state
at all: neither a proper mixture (mixed state) nor a pure
state. An impropermixture, or reduceddensitymatrix, can
only be termed a state in the context of experiments re-
stricted to only one subsystem.
This relates to the point, noted in Sect 3.4 above, that
two agents, with differing data about the same situation,
might assign different states to the same physical system.
An agent with data limited to one subsystem can appro-
priately assign the reduced density matrix as a state for
that subsystem. If however, the same agent (or a different
agent) has data relating to the wider composite system,
then only the composite system entangled state can appro-
priately be assigned.
The reduced density matrix can be used as a calcula-
tional tool, to give accurate probabilities for measurement
event outcomes, for experiments restricted to the subsys-
tem but will not give accurate probabilities when experi-
ments include the wider composite system [242, 244–246].
As noted in Sect. 3.1 above, the Schrödinger equation ap-
plies to closed systems. Reduced density matrices relate to
subsystems which, in the context of the wider composite
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system, by definition are not closed, and so, in that con-
text, the Schrödinger equation will not apply [247].
4 Measurement, decoherence and
uncertainty
Onechallenge tounderstandingmeasurement inquantum
mechanics is that the word implies a division of the world
into system, apparatus and measurer. This raises several
questions [248]. How is such a split is to be made? Can
quantum mechanics apply to the apparatus (and to the
measurer)? What if the system is closed, so that external
measurement is not possible, as would be true in apply-
ing quantummechanics to cosmology? This part considers
these questions in six stages.
Sect. 4.1 outlines two limited accounts of measure-
ment, which refer only to a system and an apparatus, and
apply quantummechanics to both. Sect. 4.2 considers the
measurement problem. Sect. 4.3 reviews the extension of
the quantum mechanical analysis to the wider environ-
ment of themeasurement. Sect. 4.4 outlines two broad cat-
egories of decoherence theory, one of which allows quan-
tum mechanical analysis of closed systems. Sect. 4.5 re-
views to what extent decoherencemight contribute to solv-
ing the conventionalmeasurement problem, or explaining
the approximate validity of classical equations of motion.
Sect. 4.6 reviews the uncertainty relations and their impli-
cations.
Several alternative approaches have been proposed
to gain information about systems other than by con-
ventional quantum mechanics measurement. Such ap-
proaches are known as weakmeasurement [249, 250], pro-
tective measurement [224, 251] and interaction-free mea-
surement [252, 253]. The understanding of such processes,
and their results, depends on which approach is taken to
understanding quantummechanics generally and, within
that, how conventional measurement is understood [206,
254–258]. These approaches are not considered further in
this review.
4.1 Quantum mechanics can apply to both
system and measuring apparatus
Von Neumann’s approach included the apparatus in the
quantum mechanical analysis, but led to an infinite
regress (each time an apparatus is included in such anal-
ysis, a further apparatus, excluded from the analysis, is
needed) [169]. Thiswasmathematically expressed in a pro-
jection postulate but the meaning was unclear [259, § 11.1].
The projection postulate rarely features in practical appli-
cations of quantummechanics [260] and its interpretation
as a physical process has been challenged as being unten-
able [22, § 1.6][233, 261].
In this review, the phrasemeasurement event refers to
the interaction of a single member, S, of an ensemble of
systems,with an apparatus, A. Both S andAhave an essen-
tial role [248], and both should be analyzed by quantum
mechanics. In this review, the word measurement refers
to a series of repeated measurement events (single runs),
on members, S, of a statistical ensemble of identically pre-
pared systems, to explore a joint property of S and A [193].
The collective outcomes of the measurement events
constitute the result of themeasurement. One aspect of the
pervasive statistical balance referred to in Sect. 2.2 above is
the care needed in discussing the result of a measurement.
The need for such care is stressed by several authors, as
outlined in the following paragraph. Underlying the need
for such care are the features of quantummechanics noted
in Sect. 2.1 above: in general it prescribes only regularities
amongmultiplemeasurement events; it does not necessar-
ily describe intrinsic features of physical systems to which
it is applied; and it suggests the possibility that events,
rather than systems, may form the fundamental ontology
of independent reality.
The result of a measurement is not ascribed to the sys-
tems, nor to their preparation, nor to the measurement,
but to the totality. The totality is a closed phenomenon,
and the prescribed probability distributions refer to this
totality [9][262, § 6]. Measured values do not necessarily
exist beforehand [22, § 4.6.1] and are defined only for the
particular combination of S and A [193]. If a property has
not been measured, the formalism does not attribute any
value [195, § 3]. Only one context justifies a claim that any
member S of the ensemble was originally such that a well-
defined value could be attributed to the property being ex-
plored in themeasurement. That context is when all single
runs give the same outcome [193].
4.2 Measurement appears to reveal a
problem in some interpretations
There is no single “measurement problem”. The term is
used in variousways. It describes challenges that can arise
in using quantummechaics to analyze (some combination
of) three groups of empirical phenomena.
1. Single runs of a measurement usually result in a sin-
gle definite outcome [263, § 1].
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2. Repetition of apparently identical single runs of a
measurement can lead to different outcomes [263,
§ 2].
3. The result of a measurement can increase, to some
extent, the ability to prescribe the results of further
measurements on the same ensemble [263, § 3].
Whether or not these phenomena generate a problem
depends on the approach taken to understanding quan-
tum mechanics [22, § 3.1.2].
For example, if states prescribe collective results for
measurement on ensembles, how does this relate (if at all)
to the outcome of single runs [23, p. 327]? For those who
limit the role of quantum mechanics to prescribing collec-
tive results for measurement on ensembles, this problem
might not arise [163, ch. 3][209, § 3].
More specifically, how can a single observed outcome
in any single run, be consistent with the final state for
the composite system [S+A], arising from the Schrödinger
equation [259, ch. 11]?
– This problem arisesmost clearly when the final com-
posite state is a pure superposition state [259, p.
441].
– This problem also arises, however, even if the fi-
nal state is a mixed state: in that case there is,
again, more than one possible measurement event
outcome. Consequently, this problem is not solved
by proving that interference terms (see Sect. 3.5
above) vanish from a superposition state. Any solu-
tionmust also showhowamixed state can be consis-
tent with a single outcome [259, p. 443][263, § 1]. As
noted in Sect. 3.3 above, a mixed state can bemathe-
matically represented as an aggregate of pure states
in many ways [264]. This makes it difficult to solve
the problem [23, p. 338].
– Where this problemarises, it cannot be dismissed by
arguing that, although the composite system [S+A]
state is entangled and superposed, there is a state
for one of the subsystems (for S or for A)which is nei-
ther. As noted in Sect. 3.7 above, for any entangled
composite system state, considering either subsys-
tem as represented by any state yields probabilities
inconsistent with the composite system state [265].
Even more specifically, why is the particular outcome
observed in a given single run, rather than another out-
come [266, § 2.2.3]? This partly relates to statistical bal-
ance among outcomes: observation (in a single run) of one
value rather than another, contributes to collective out-
come statistics. As noted in Sect. 2.2 above, explaining sta-
tistical balance is generally seen as outside the scope of
quantummechanics, and so in this review, the term “mea-
surement problem” will not include this question.
Most statements of themeasurement problem assume
an ability to solve the Schrödinger equation for every phys-
ical system. For a complex system such as an apparatus,
however, it may be that the equation can, neither analyti-
cally nor numerically, be solved. If so, then quantum me-
chanics cannot be applied to the apparatus, and the mea-
surement problem does not arise [148, 267].
Whether or not the problem can be solved depends on
its premises and formulation in any given interpretation
[164, 193][217, § 2.4][218][259, § 11.2][268, ch. 5][269, 270].
This is illustrated in the following section.
4.3 Including the environment in the
analysis explains unique outcomes
Many analyses ofmeasurement reflect an implicit assump-
tion that the initial state of each of (separately) S and A is
a pure state. While S can initially be in a pure (or a mixed)
state, in practice it is inappropriate to assume an initial
pure state for A [22, § 3.3.1][193].
Regardless of the initial states of S and A, the interac-
tion between S and A will, at least in theory, lead to a final
state representing the composite system [S+A] which is an
entangled state. Including the environment, E, leads to the
state representing the composite system [S+A+E] being an
entangled state [164].
Before considering the effect of E, the state for [S+A]
is an entangled state. As noted in Sect. 3.6 above, such
states include both interference terms denoting statistical
balance between subsystem outcomes (where S and A are
subsystems), and terms representing the outcomes them-
selves.
Now considering the effect of E, within the entangled
state for [S+A+E] a reduced density matrix can be derived
for the subsystem [S+A], which will give accurate predic-
tions for experiments restricted to [S+A] (as noted in Sect.
3.7 above). The reduced density matrix for [S+A], in com-
mon with the state for [S+A] before considering E, must
have interference terms, in order to give accurate predic-
tions, for experiments restricted to [S+A].
In practice, however, except for well-isolated,
carefully-prepared systems, the interaction of [S+A]with E,
leads to the interference terms in the reduced density ma-
trix for [S+A] (representing statistical balance among sub-
systems S and A) becoming extremely small very swiftly
[242]. Thus the reduced density matrix (for [S+A]) can be
treated, approximately, as having no interference terms,
similar to a mixed state density matrix.
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The composite system [S+A+E] is still represented
by an entangled state and so, in that wider context, no
state can appropriately represent any individual subsys-
tem. Measurement of an observable that only pertains to
[S+A] cannot distinguish between the total ([S+A+E]) pure
state and the (approximate, [S+A])mixed state but, in prin-
ciple, measurements involving E will always allow such a
distinction to be made [242, 246, 247, 271]. This all follows
from the nature of a reduced density matrix, as discussed
in Sect. 3.7 above.
Quantum statistical mechanical analysis can build on
this approach [193]. Such analysis can demonstrate that,
after the interference terms in the reduced density ma-
trix for [S+A] have become negligibly small, the remain-
ing terms relax towards a thermal equilibrium [23, p.328],
which is equivalent to a mixed state [25, p. 92].
At this stage it is possible to account for arbitrary
subensembles of single runs. Large subensembles would
statistically resemble the full ensemble, but more excep-
tional subensembles can act as a substitute for single
systems. Information about any single run is gathered
through all the subensembles in which it is embedded.
This approach can explain the uniqueness of the outcome
of each single run [50, § 9.6][193]. The framework, however,
can neither describe nor explain why, for any single run,
one particular outcome arises rather than another [272].
This use of quantum statistical mechanics combines:
rigorous and detailed mathematical analysis of each ele-
ment and stage of the measurement process; with careful
use of approximations, such as disregarding events with
very small probability, and ignoring possible recurrences
after very long times [23]. Other analyses [259, § 11.4][270,
§ 7][273, 274] also suggest that this type of rigorously de-
tailed analysis can explain the occurrence of just one out-
come.
4.4 Types of decoherence: extending the
quantum mechanical analysis
The questions noted at the start of Part 4 motivate an ac-
count of measurement which, in principle, allows quan-
tummechanics to apply beyond the measured system and
apparatus, andalso to closed systems.Decoherence theory
can at least contribute to such an account.
As noted in Sect. 3.5 above, in the context of super-
position states generally, coherence refers to the existence
of interference terms, which represent only statistical bal-
ance between outcomes. Decoherence theories explore
physical andmathematical processeswhich lead to thedis-
appearance of such interference terms [246]. Such theories
involve coarse-graining: the use of reasonable approxima-
tions [234, 275]. There are several approaches to the mod-
elling of decoherence, which are being refined in the light
of ongoing experimental testing [276].
There are two broad categories of decoherence theory.
1. Environment-induced, or extrinsic, decoherence in-
volves the disappearance of interference terms, over
time, induced by an external agent [234]. This in-
volvesmathematical analysis of thephysical process
of measuring a specific observable as described in
Sect. 4.3. As noted in Sect. 3.6, in entangled superpo-
sition states, coherence includes statistical balance
between measurement event outcomes for measure-
ments on different subsystems. In the mathemati-
cal analysis, this balance is reflected in interference
terms. As noted in Sect. 4.3, considering the envi-
ronment initially introduces statistical balance in a
higher order form [164] but, in practice, the interac-
tionwith E leads to interference terms in the reduced
density matrix for [S+A] becoming extremely small
very swiftly. A coarse-grained approximation, which
ignores E and the residual balance, eliminates co-
herence [275]. Typically the environment analysed is
limited to laboratory apparatus. Although, in princi-
ple, the environment could be extended to include
the measurer, this is not possible in practice. As
noted in Sect. 4.2 above, even for a complex system
such as an apparatus, it may be that the Schrödinger
equation can, neither analytically nor numerically,
be solved. Thiswould certainly be true of an environ-
ment which included a human (or feline) measurer.
2. Self-induced, or intrinsic, decoherence results from
the basic properties of the system [234, 277]. Suchde-
coherence is unrelated to measurement and so can
apply to closed systems, for example in cosmology
[277, 278]. Intrinsic decoherence is a relative process.
In the mathematical analysis of a closed system, it
is (notionally) split into an open subsystem (consist-
ing of the parts, or aspects, of the closed system
in which we are interested) and a residual subsys-
tem (the closed system’s other parts, or aspects). In
a coarse-grained approximation, ignoring the resid-
ual subsystem, interference terms disappear (and
so coherence is eliminated) for the open subsystem
[275].
In this review the term intrinsic decoherence refers
only to the coarse-graining approach described above. The
same term is also used to refer to analyses which explore
a possible breakdown of quantum mechanics [276]. Such
analyses are quite distinct from the coarse-graining ap-
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proaches described above, and are not covered in this re-
view.
Both types of coarse-graining decoherence can be
linked within a common mathematical framework [275].
Extrinsic decoherence can be seen as a special form of the
more general intrinsic decoherence [234].
4.5 Decoherence: not in itself a solution, but
useful in particular contexts
Does decoherence offer a solution to the challenge of an-
alyzing measurement in quantum mechanics? This ques-
tion need a careful response [279, 280].
– Decoherence is a probabilistic concept and the only
operational way of identifying decoherence is in the
statistical behaviour of an ensemble [234].
– Decoherence theory can be applied in different inter-
pretations of quantummechanics [234]. As noted in
Sect. 4.2 above, the nature and extent of the mea-
surement problem depends on the interpretation.
Thus the implications of decoherence theory for the
measurement problem depend on specific interpre-
tative framework used [245, 260, 266, 279, 281].
– Extrinsic decoherence theory involves a split be-
tween an ignored E and a considered [S+A], and
so can be seen as involving something similar to
von Neumann’s infinite regress (see Sect. 4.1 above)
[271].
Many believe that decoherence by itself does not solve
the measurement problem [164][218, § 5][245, 247][268, p.
160][277, § 9][279, § 3.2][282]. This is because the reduced
density matrix obtained by ignoring the environment is
mathematically similar to amixed state. Amixed state fails
to explain, and is inconsistent with, the occurrence of just
one outcome.
Some of the sources just cited, however, were pub-
lished before the results of the quantum statistical me-
chanics approach,mentioned in Sect. 4.3 above [193]. That
approach appears to explain the occurrence of just one
outcome. It does so by a treatment of the measuring pro-
cess which is more comprehensive than that of many pa-
pers dealingwith decoherence [50, pp. 270–273]. Themore
recent papers refer neither to the quantum statistical me-
chanics approach [23, 193], nor to the other analyses men-
tioned in Sect. 4.3 above [259, § 11.4][270, § 7][273, 274], and
so do not undermine the validity of such approaches.
More generally, a quantum-mechanical account of
classical behaviour should also explain the approximate
validity of classical equations ofmotion [283]. This has not
yet been comprehensively done, and is likely to be com-
plex [279, § 3.3][284], although some have already claimed
success [285]. Decoherencemay be part of the explanation
but other components are likely to beneeded too [280, 283].
For example, it may be that classical limit of quantumme-
chanics is classical statistical mechanics [286]. Explaining
the motion of isolated systems may, in principle, not need
to invoke decoherence, although it may be helpful in prac-
tice [164].
In summary:
– the combination of quantum statistical mechanics
with extrinsic decoherence theory, allows the mea-
surement problem to be solved, in those approaches
to quantummechanics in which it arises; and
– decoherence theory may yet form part of a success-
ful strategy to explain,more generally, howclassical
mechanics emerges from quantummechanics.
4.6 Uncertainty: a feature of statistics but
not necessarily of systems
There are several different groups of uncertainty relations
[194, 287–289][290, § 2].
– The Kennard-Weyl-Robertson uncertainty relations
set, for two measurement types, a lower bound on
the product of the standard deviations of measure-
ment event outcomes, for an ensemble of systems.
– The Heisenberg noise (or error) disturbance uncer-
tainty relations set a lower bound on the product of
the noise (a measure of accuracy) in a position mea-
surement and the resultingmomentum disturbance.
– The Heisenberg joint measurement uncertainty rela-
tions set, for an apparatus jointly measuring A and
B, a lower bound on the product of the noise in the A
measurement and the noise in the B measurement.
All three groups of relations relate to measurement,
but they do so in very different ways. For example, only
the Heisenberg joint measurement group of relations deal
with the extent towhich two quantities can bemeasured at
the same time. The differences between the groups of rela-
tions are not always sufficiently recognized. This can lead
to significant confusion, mainly because the status of the
three groups is very different.
– The Kennard-Weyl-Robertson uncertainty relations
were derived as a rigorous mathematical conse-
quence of the quantum formalism.
– In contrast, the precise termsof the latter twogroups
of relations have been challenged, and various ver-
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sions have been derived [22, § 7.10][24, 25][175, § 9.2 -
§ 9.4][287–289, 291–293].
In the context of the Kennard-Weyl-Robertson rela-
tions, uncertainty is a precise statistical measure (the stan-
dard deviation) of the spread of futuremeasurement event
outcomes for large numbers of identically-prepared sys-
tems [292].
The Kennard-Weyl-Robertson relations can be read as
a fundamental limitation on the possibility of preparing
an ensemble of systems which, for any two measurement
types, has statistical spreads that violate the inequality [22,
§ 1.7.1][25][173][178, p. 62][179, 194, 294].
TheKennard-Weyl-Robertsonuncertainty relations de-
pend on the state. Some states involve, for specific mea-
surement types, no statistical fluctuation in measurement
event outcomes, and the lower bound is zero [25, 289].
Heisenberg’s semiclassical discussion of the noise dis-
turbance relation (for a microscope) can, with care, be ex-
pressed in the quantum formalism [287]. Different versions
can be derived [295]. Rigorous analysis of measurement
interactions, direct computations and subsequent experi-
ments, have all shown violation of at least one version of
the noise disturbance relation [296–299].
The relations are often discussed informally in ways
that suggest they relate to an individual system. There is,
however, no obvious way to formally apply the relations to
an individual system, in termsof values assigned to observ-
ables, or properties possessed [173, p. 14][175, § 9.2][185,
Part 1].
– One reason is that the derivation and terms (such as
standarddeviation) of the relations are explicitly sta-
tistical.
– Another reason is that, as noted in Sect. 2.1 above,
quantum mechanics in general prescribes only reg-
ularities among multiple measurement events, and
does not necessarily describe intrinsic features of
physical systems to which it is applied. On this ba-
sis the relations can be seen as highlighting further
aspects of the statistical balance described in Sect.
2.2 above.
Thus, considering observables, and associated proper-
ties, relevant to the measurement types, the relations are
silent on whether or not observables, or properties, might
have definite values in a single system [25, 294, 300].
As noted in Sect. 1.6 above, the treatment of time in
quantum mechanics is unresolved. Subject to being clear
on the precise meaning given to time, and to precisely stat-
ing the aspect of energy considered, a range of time-energy
uncertainty relations can be derived. The validity of any
such relation will be subject to the terms on which it has
been derived [90, 301][302, p. 46].
In summary, the uncertainty relations appear to spec-
ify features of the statistical balance among outcomes of
measurement events in a statistical ensemble. There is no
obvious way to formally apply the relations to an individ-
ual system, in terms of values assigned to observables, or
properties possessed.
5 Experiments, thought
experiments and other analyses
5.1 The two-slit experiment: no clear
implications, but several possibilities
In the two-slit experiment, placing a quantum system on
one side of the two slits produces a series of single, bright
spots at specific, unpredictable locations on the screen
on the other side of the slits. In this sense the system ex-
hibits particle properties, at a specific time and place on
the screen [303, 304].
If both slits are open then, when sufficiently many
spots have appeared on the screen, an interference pattern
emerges. At first sight, this resembles a classical wave ef-
fect, but on closer analysis the analogy is only partial [305].
– Any wave model would require the system to com-
bine a wave aspect, from the slits to the screen, and
a particle aspect at the screen [304].
– A wave model also suggests that two detectors, one
behind each slit, should click simultaneously, but
this generally does not happen [18][306, § 9, § 10].
Attempts to determine facts at either slit generally de-
stroy the interference pattern [268, § 6.3][307]. The deci-
sion whether or not to make such a determination can be
deferred until the system (if it is assumed to move from
source to screen) would have passed the slits (a delayed-
choice experiment). In such a delayed-choice experiment,
the existence or non-existence of interference in the past,
seems to be determined by a choice in the present [308].
Closer analysis of the relevant superposition states, how-
ever, reveals that the effect does not require present influ-
ence over the past [309].
The determination is often described as a which-way
measurement, but this description ismisleading [309–311].
As noted in Sect. 2.1 above, quantum mechanics suggests
the possibility that events, rather than systems, may form
the fundamental ontology of independent reality. Even if
continuously existing systems are assumed, a detector in-
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teracting with a system does not necessarily imply that
such a system has followed a particular route in physical
space. Any such inference involves multiple untested as-
sumptions about what happened prior to detection [128,
§ 3]. Recent experiments reveal possible evidence of as-
pects of a system’s past, but there is not consensus on the
meaning of the results [257, 312].
The results of the two-slit experiment are often sum-
marized as single particle interference [232, pp. 8–9],
which underlines the ongoing lack of clarity on how to
understand any particle concept in quantum mechanics
[22, § 2.4.4][313–317]. There are, however, several possible
explanations for the difference between classical mechan-
ics and the (verified) statistical prescriptions of quantum
mechanics. One potential explanation is that interference
may result from spacetime being discrete rather than con-
tinuous (see Sect. 1.6 above) [185, Part 1][318], or otherwise
differing from that assumed by classical mechanics [319,
§ 3]. Explanations are also possible in some theories based
on system positions (see Sect. 6.2 below). A third possibil-
ity is that interferencemay reflect the final state of each sys-
tem combining with its initial state, in a time-symmetric
approach [305] (see Sect. 6.4 below).
It has been suggested that the usual probability calcu-
lus breaks down in the context of quantum interference.
This argument is misleading [136][268, § 6]. It is true that
thedata donot admit any simpleKolmogorovmodelwhich
does not include rules for different contexts. The data re-
quire a Kolmogorov model with a probability space for
each context (see Sect. 1.8 above). This combines data for
distinct contexts: each context has a simple Kolmogorov
model, but an interference term arises when adding prob-
abilities from different contexts [185, Part 2][320].
Overall, even within the domain of appropriate infer-
ences from the two-slit data to the behaviour of physical
systems, the range of possibilities does not allow any clear
conclusions on the nature of independent reality.
5.2 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: steering a
reduced density matrix
A Kennard-Weyl-Robertson relation (Sect. 4.6 above) can
be derived for position and momentum. One consequence
of this relation is that, for any ensemble, there will be
statistical fluctuation in outcomes for at least one of (a)
repeated position measurement events and (b) repeated
momentum measurement events. As noted in Sect. 4.1
above, only if all the single runs in a measurement pro-
cess give the same outcome, can awell-defined value be at-
tributed to the relevant property for the pre-measurement
system. Thus the relevant Kennard-Weyl-Robertson rela-
tion implies that quantummechanics is unable to attribute
well-defined values to both position and momentum, for
any given ensemble.
In the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper [321], the au-
thors analyzed a thought experiment, in which a pair of
systems is created such that (a) if position (relative to the
creation point) is measured for each, the results will be
equal and opposite; and (b) if momentum for each is mea-
sured, the results will be equal and opposite. An observer,
O2, might carry out a measurement, on system 2, of either
position (and then predict with certainty the result of a po-
sitionmeasurement on system 1), ormomentum (and then
predict with certainty the result of a momentum measure-
ment on system 1).
In other words, the measurements on one system ap-
pear to affect the probability distributions for the other
system, regardless of how far apart they are. The Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen argument was that either the properties
of system 1 depend on O2’s measurement result, or quan-
tummechanics is incomplete. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen re-
jected the first possibility and were “thus forced to con-
clude” [321] that quantum mechanics is incomplete [25,
§ 9.3.1][53][159, § 3.2][268, § 7.1].
It appeared that O2 could choose which of two sepa-
rate sets the state for system 1 will belong to: either the set
of states for which, in a position measurement, each sin-
gle run will have the same outcome; or the set of states for
which, in amomentummeasurement, each single runwill
have the same outcome. Schrödinger informally described
this as O2 steering, or piloting, system 1 [322].
A more precise approach recognizes that the pair of
systems must be treated as a composite system repre-
sented by an entangled state [159, § 3.2][212, 323]. As out-
lined in Sects. 3.6 and 3.7 above, one consequence is that
any state which represents either subsystem in isolation
will be inconsistent with the entangled composite system
state, in relation to experiments on the whole composite
system. The state for subsystem 1 (which O2 appears to
steer) is a reduced density matrix for subsystem 1, in rela-
tion to the entangled composite system state.
A second consequence is that the collective outcomes
of measurements performed on different subsystems are
statistically balanced. As noted in Sect. 2.2 above, accept-
ing the existence of such statistical balance does not im-
ply any explanation of its source. Statistical balance does
not necessarily imply causal connection, nor does it neces-
sarily imply signalling between subsystems [324, § 5][325].
The statistical balance arises here because the pair, repre-
sented by an entangled state, is treated as a single entity
in quantummechanics. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen con-
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clusion is only “forced” if the pair is treated as appropri-
ately represented by two separate states, one assigned to
each of the pair [235, § 2.3][326].
5.3 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: statistical
balance, not correlation
As noted in Sect. 3.6, the strangeness of entanglement is
statistical balance among collective outcomes, for mea-
surements ofmore than one observable, on distant subsys-
tems. In the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen context, each pair is
a composite system with two subsystems. In theory, the
outcome of a position measurement event for one subsys-
tem is equal and opposite to the outcome of such an event
for the other (although verifying this in practice is hard).
Again in theory, the outcome of a momentum measure-
ment event for one subsystem is equal and opposite to
such an outcome for the other.
These features strongly resemble features of classical
physics in which the term correlation might be used with-
out controversy. It is therefore common to refer to corre-
lations in this context, and to explore their implications
in terms of causation [327]. There are, however, reasons
to doubt that such an approach is appropriate. The word
correlation carries at least some connotation of causation,
or predetermination of properties unrelated to measure-
ment. As noted in Sect. 4.1, however, in quantummechan-
ics, measured values do not necessarily exist beforehand,
are specific to a particular system/apparatus combination,
and can be attributed only after a measurement.
All that said, at first sight the combination of the fol-
lowing two facts still appears strange.
1. For a given ensemble of (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen)
pairs, quantum mechanics is able to attribute a
well-defined relationship (“equal and opposite”) be-
tween subsystem outcomes for each of position and
(separately) momentummeasurements.
2. For the same ensemble of pairs, however, quantum
mechanics is unable to attribute to the composite
system well-defined values for both (together) posi-
tion and momentum.
The features of quantummechanics highlighted in ear-
lier sections of this review shed some light on the source
of the apparent strangeness. As noted in Sect. 2.1, quan-
tummechanics does not necessarily describe physical sys-
tems, and usually prescribes only regularities among mul-
tiple measurement events. As noted in Sect. 3.2, quan-
tum mechanics probability distributions reflect a statisti-
cal balance in collective outcomes, bothwithin ensembles,
and among ensembles for differingmeasurement types. As
noted in Sect. 3.6, a composite system entangled state re-
lates to an ensemble, empirically different from any com-
bination of ensembles relevant to any states for the sys-
tems which combined to produce the composite. As noted
in Sect. 4.1, if a property has not been measured, quan-
tummechanics does not permit any value to be attributed.
Also as noted in Sect. 4.1, only if all the single runs in a
measurement process give the same outcome, can a well-
defined value be attributed to the relevant property for the
pre-measurement system.
Overall, if anything is strange in the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen context, it relates to some of the features
in the immediately preceding paragraph, rather than to
the first of the facts noted in the paragraph before that.
For this reason, it appears more appropriate to use the
term statistical balance, rather than correlation, to de-
scribe the phenomenon of entanglement. There is a sense
in which entanglement is merely a more complex, and
salutary, manifestation of the statistical balance that per-
vades quantum mechanics [184, 186] (being the core con-
cept reflected in the quantum mechanical prescriptions
for statistical ensembles: see Sect. 2.2 above). This idea
(that entanglement reflects features which are also seen in
quantum mechanical analysis of non-composite systems)
was immediately noted by Schrödinger [183, § 10, § 11], and
continues to be endorsed [22, § 6.4][328, § V.F].
5.4 Building on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen:
Bell explores the implications
Some counterfactual statements are true. For example, “in
an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair represented by a compos-
ite system entangled state, if both subsystems are sub-
ject to measurements of position, then the results will
sum to zero”. Care is needed in considering the implica-
tions of such a statement. As noted in Sects. 5.2 and 5.3
above, it does not necessarily imply pre-existing proper-
ties, causal connection, signalling or instruction sets that
fix outcomes. Nor does it necessarily imply the truth of
other counterfactual statements such as: “if the position
of one is measured with result +1 and the position of the
other is not measured, then if (counterfactually) the posi-
tion of that other had beenmeasured then the resultwould
have been -1”.
Some of these possible implications were explored
by Bell [329]. Instead of position and momentum, Bell
considered different components of a property known as
spin. The relevant Kennard-Weyl-Robertson relation im-
plies that quantum mechanics is unable to attribute well-
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defined values to both of two differing components of spin,
for any given ensemble. Bell analyzed a composite system
entangled state, which entails that the result of measur-
ing any chosen spin component for one subsystem, can be
predicted by first measuring the same component for the
other.
Considering measurements on selected components
of the spins, Bell hypothesized that if two measurements
are made, when the subsystems are far apart, then the set-
ting of the first measurement (as to which component of
spin is to be measured) does not influence the result of the
second. Bell suggested that this would imply that the re-
sult of the second measurement must be predetermined,
which in turn implies the possibility of a more complete
specification of the system than is given by the state.
Bell assumed such a specification, derived a resulting
inequality, and showed that it is violated by the predic-
tions of quantum mechanics. Bell concluded “In a theory
in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to
determine the results of individual measurements, with-
out changing the statistical predictions, there must be a
mechanism whereby the setting of one measuring device
can influence the reading of another instrument, however
remote . . . , . . . instantaneously . . .” [329].
5.5 Bell inequalities: much exploration of
assumptions but little consensus
Many papers written since Bell’s 1964 paper have sought
– to make precise the assumptions on which the in-
equality depends,
– to explore what possible conclusions follow from
these assumptions, and
– to establish to what extent such conclusions can be
verified experimentally.
Little consensus has been reached in any of these ar-
eas. The rest of this section considers the assumptions on
which this type of inequality depends. The next section
considers what conclusions emerge, from the theoretical
and experimental investigation of such inequalities.
Some analyze assumptions in terms of locality [175,
§ 8.6][293, 330], causality [175, § 8.7][331, 332] and local
causality [333, 334]. Whether or not such assumptions nec-
essarily imply counterfactual reasoning is not a straight-
forward question [335]. Others argue that Bell’s inequality
involves assumptions relating to distinguishability [336],
determinism [158], ergodicity [337, 338], time-independent
variables [339] or temporal locality [88, § 7].
Some focus on the assumption that changing an ap-
paratus setting does not affect the distribution of any vari-
ables that determine the measurement event outcomes
(measurement independence or free will). Supporters of
this free will assumption argue that correlations between
the systems and the settings chosen would have to be
amazingly strong for it to be violated [161, 340]. This so-
called conspiracy is, however, difficult to rule out [159,
§ 5.7.3][341][342, § 5][343][344, Appendix][345, § 4]. It is also
consistent with the view that free will is only practical
and epistemic (see Sect. 1.9 above). Arguments for the free
will assumption may themselves involve circular reason-
ing [151, § 5.1].
Some question the apparent failure to correctly take
into account the apparatus parameters, for different ap-
paratus settings. Correctly treating the apparatus param-
eters, which amounts to assuming a form of contextuality,
appears to prevent the inequalities from being derived [22,
§ 9.1.3][166, 346–352], but this view has been challenged
[353]. An equivalent argument challenges the apparent as-
sumption that there exists a single Kolmogorov probability
space describing the statistical data collected by incompat-
ible experiments [131, 135][175, § 8.5][181, 354, 355]. Asmen-
tioned at the end of Sect. 1.8 above, this may not be appro-
priate but, either way, none of the papers just cited refer to
a previous claim that Bell’s inequality can be proved with-
out this assumption [293, pp. 83-85].
5.6 Bell inequalities: few clear implications
from experimental investigation
Given the lack of consensus on what assumptions are, or
should be, the basis for Bell-type inequalities, it is unsur-
prising that differing conclusions are drawn.
Some frame conclusions in terms of possible alterna-
tives: realism or locality, but there is no single view of the
meaning of these terms in such a juxtaposition [61, 306,
340, 356–359].
More fundamentally, some of those who challenge the
appropriateness of mathematical or physical assumptions
(as described in Sect. 5.5 above) deny that the inequali-
ties indicate anything significant about either locality or
realism [22, § 9.3.2][166, 342, 352]. Another fundamental
concern is that many definitions of, or assumptions about,
realism used in discussing Bell-type inequalities appear
to be inconsistent with what are otherwise known to be
core features of quantum theory [5, § 2.2][22, § 9.1.3][166,
§ 1][360].
This points to an even more fundamental reason to
doubt that the inequalities indicate anything about either
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locality or realism [184, 186]. As noted at the end of Sect.
5.3 above, the entanglement analyzed in the inequalities is
simply one manifestation of the statistical balance which
pervades quantummechanics. As noted in Sect. 2.2 above,
few consider the explanation of that balance to be within
the remit of quantum mechanics. In the absence of a the-
ory to explain the pervasive statistical balance, the particu-
lar balance analyzed in the inequalities cannot justify con-
clusions on realism or locality. As also noted in Sect. 2.2
above, one explanation of the pervasive statistical balance
is based on a conservation principle operating on average
for ensemble. Such a principle can be used to derive the
Bell inequalities without the need for any assumptions on
locality or reality [361].
Overall, there is no consensus onwhether or not quan-
tum mechanics is local. Nor is there any consensus on
which of the many possible meanings of locality is the
most useful in this context.
Experimental investigation of the inequalities has also
been ongoing. Experiments aiming to explore a Bell in-
equality involve multiple challenges. Many of these relate
to the fact that, as noted in Sect. 2.1 above, both the predic-
tions of quantum mechanics, and the data used to verify
them, are in terms of events rather than systems. Some of
theproblems that canarise relate tounchallengedassump-
tions, incomplete analysis, insufficient statistics, incorrect
statistical analyses, incomplete data (due to data discard-
ing or postselection), spurious data (noise, dark counts,
accidental counts) and corrupted data [362, 363]. For ex-
ample, one common assumption is fair sampling, mean-
ing that the observed outcomes of detections faithfully re-
produce the outcome statistics of all emissions. Another
assumption involves how best to pair together outcomes
by reference to detection times.
No experiment can entirely overcome the multiple
challenges. There is a widespread view that a series of re-
cent experiments [168, 364–366] has dealt with all the sig-
nificant challenges simultaneously. There is however on-
going and significant dissent from this view [367].
The fundamental issue remains, regardless ofwhether
or not experiments succeed in overcoming the challenges.
Bell experiment results are often claimed to constrain how
quantummechanics canbeunderstood.Many such claims
appear, however, to be inappropriate, given the lack of con-
sensus (outlined above) on the theoretical aspects of the
inequalities [132, 166, 338, 367–369].
5.7 The Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem:
contextuality through mathematics?
The Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem is about the mathemat-
ical formalism of quantum mechanics. The theorem ap-
pears to show that quantum mechanics is inconsistent
with the idea that measurement involves the ascertain-
ing of a pre-existing value of a property [370]. Like the
derivation of Bell’s inequality, the Bell-Kochen-Specker
theorem considers the possibility that parameters might
be added to the formalism to determine individual mea-
surement outcomes. The theorem shows that, in any the-
ory involving such parameters which satisfies certain re-
quirements, a contradiction arises. This implies that not
all of the (mathematical) assumptions can be consistently
held [25, 306].
As with Bell’s inequality, there is a lack of consensus
on how to understand these assumptions physically, and
so a range of views on how various assumptions might be
abandoned, and what implications would follow.
– In one view, systems have definite values for all mag-
nitudes, but the result of ameasurement depends on
what else is measured at the same time. Thus an ob-
servable can only be fully defined by specifying the
entiremeasurement context [293]. This does not rule
out objective properties, but suggests that properties
may not be knowable [370].
– In another approach, systems again have definite
values for all magnitudes, but it is possible that
someof those values cannot be revealed bymeasure-
ments. In this case, the Bell-Kochen-Specker theo-
rem does not imply that the results depend on the
context [371].
– A third approach suggests that systems may not
have definite values for all magnitudes, and so
measurement event outcomes might not be deter-
mined in advance: a value-indefinite independent
reality [372, 373]. In other words, systems may not
have case-properties (determinately valued proper-
ties) for all their type-properties (determinable prop-
erties) [374], a radical revision to more common
views [375].
– A fourth approach involves properties or systems be-
ing indistinguishable [376, § 4.1].
– A fifth approach takes potential states of affairs to be
elements of independent reality [188].
Most approaches involve a form of contextuality [376,
377]. Contextuality is generally defined relative to one spe-
cific approach to quantum mechanics [371]. Broadly, con-
textuality suggests that the value assigned to a property
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depends on the measurement process [306]. Some sug-
gest that experimental proofs of contextuality are possi-
ble but any experiment is likely to be based on one spe-
cific definition of contextuality [371], and contextuality is
usually only sufficient, not necessary, to explain the rele-
vant results [26]. The Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem itself
cannot be directly tested experimentally (as any such test
depends on how the assumptions are understood phys-
ically) [26, 326, 378], although this view has been chal-
lenged [379].
Overall, it is difficult to argue that the Bell-Kochen-
Specker theoremnecessarily supports anyparticular views
on the interpretation of quantummechanics [22, § 10.2.3].
5.8 Quantum field theory: no easier to
understand than quantum mechanics
As noted in Sect. 1.6 above, when phenomena and systems
need tobe treated in the integrated spacetimeof special rel-
ativity, themain approach is relativistic quantum field the-
ory. Consideration of quantum field theory may shed light
on some of the problems of understanding nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics [74, 75, 85, 86]. Such consideration
has, however, not yet resolved the problems of trying to un-
derstand quantum mechanics. Indeed new foundational
questions arise [22, § 2.4.4][140, 143, 380][381, § 10.4.2][382].
This section outlines some of these new questions.
The fields in the formalismof quantumfield theory are
mathematical terms, which do not necessarily correspond
to physical fields [177, § 2]. Like quantum mechanics (see
Sect. 2.1 above), the predictions and verification of quan-
tum field theory deal with events [143, 383], but the the-
ory assumes the existence of entities as well as events. The
standardmodel in physics involves particles and forces. To
what extent do these notions reflect independent reality?
There are significant challenges facing any such sugges-
tion [56, § 6.4.2].
In quantum field theory, particles can be seen as as-
pects of the mathematical fields [140, 384, 385], and some
argue that particles should be taken as ontological [177,
§ 2]. These particle aspects of fields are termed quanta, be-
cause they do not share all the features of particles in clas-
sical physics [386]. In quantum field theory, some terms
in the mathematical analysis can be seen as reflecting cre-
ation and destruction of quanta [387, § 4], but such terms
might not necessarily correspond to physical processes [22,
§ 2.4.4][140, 143, 388].
Similarly, some suggest that so-called “virtual parti-
cles” might not be physical [302]. Others, however, argue
that virtual particles are no less part of independent reality
than are quanta more generally [389].
How do quanta differ from classical particles? Unlike
classical particles, quanta may not be capable of bearing
labels (to allow them tobe trackedover time) [384, 388] but
this remains unresolved [17, 376]. Either way, could quanta
still be particle-like because quanta are aggregable? In
other words, can a determinate number of quanta be in a
given systemwithout the quanta having, in a formal sense,
self-identity?Anotherway inwhichquantamaydiffer from
classical particles is if there is not an appropriate sense in
which they are localized [386].
Are quantum fields any less conceptually challenging
than quanta? This is not yet clear [56, § 6.4.3]. Similar argu-
ments to those that undermine theparticle picture canalso
be turned against fields [390], but defenders of the field in-
terpretation suggest that such arguments are not conclu-
sive [391] [392, § 5].
One advantage of an empiricist approach (as outlined
in Sect. 3.4) is that it avoids any choice between physical
quantum fields and physical quanta. In this approach the
quantum mechanical description corresponds directly to
neither [22, § 2.4.4].
There are several approaches to the mathematical for-
mulation of quantum field theory [56, § 6.3.5]. Which ap-
proach should form the basis of its interpretation? There
is ongoing disagreement on this question [393, 394].
The ongoing experimental exploration of quantum
field theory, helpfully and vividly illustrates two features
which quantumfield theory shareswith quantummechan-
ics [193, pp. 7, 135]. One is the enormous size of the “appara-
tus” (such as the Large Hadron Collider in Geneva) relative
to the “systems” under investigation. The other is the auto-
matic recording and analysis of “measurement”, without
human intervention.
6 Specific approaches to quantum
mechanics
Parts 2 to 5 above used only precise non-mathematical
language to review characteristics of quantum mechanics
which are central to understanding it. This Part 6 consid-
ers towhat extent the findings of this revieware supported,
illustrated, or developed in a review (with this limited fo-
cus) of some historic and current specific approaches to
understanding quantummechanics.
As noted in Sect. 1.1 above, there have been, and cur-
rently are, many different approaches to understanding
quantum mechanics. Some of these aim to develop a the-
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ory which might, in general rather than only rarely, de-
scribe individual systems (not just statistically prescribe
collective outcomes) and so deal more fully with indepen-
dent reality. Neither the Bell, nor the Bell-Kochen-Specker,
analyses necessarily rule out the possibility of such the-
ories, given the lack of consensus on their interpretation
and implications (Sects. 5.5 to 5.7 above).
Reviews of the various approaches to quantum me-
chanics often start with the Copenhagen interpretation.
The term Copenhagen interpretation was first used in 1955,
by Heisenberg [395, § 4], and implies some combination
of the views of different physicists associated with, or in-
fluenced by, Bohr [396, p. 462]. Some have attempted to
specify core elements of this interpretation [8, § 3.4][22,
§ 4.1][397, § 3.3]. These analyses acknowledge, however,
that there is no single, agreed definition of the Copen-
hagen approach [292, 395]. For this reason, Sect. 6.1 out-
lines only the approach advocated by Bohr. Some views
outlined in later sections (for example, some in Sect. 6.6)
have also been identified as Copenhagen interpretations
[396, § 3].
6.1 Bohr: is a theory more descriptive than
quantum mechanics possible?
Bohr’s own approach was often based more on intuition
and philosophy than onmathematical analysis [398]. This
is partly consistent with the approach to understand-
ing quantum mechanics outlined in Sect. 1.2 above: the
recognition of qualitative characteristics, through con-
cepts shared with other scientific theories. Bohr, however,
did not use non-mathematical language in a disciplined,
precise or rigorous way. For example, what Bohr meant
by “complementarity” is the subject of ongoing debate [22,
§ 4.6.3][399–403].
Three aspects of Bohr’s approach were, however,
clear.
One is that, for Bohr, the formalism applies only to
phenomena (“observations obtained under specified cir-
cumstances”) [404, p. 64][405, § 3.3]. A phenomenon in-
volves a system interacting with an apparatus, leading to
an outcome. Consistent with the outline in Sect. 4.1 above,
this is distinct from the system in isolation [406]. It appears
that quantummechanics, for Bohr, does not deal with sys-
tems, but with events [292]. This highlights that, as noted
in Sect. 2.1 above, quantum mechanics does not necessar-
ily describe the physical systems to which it is applied,
and usually prescribes only regularities among multiple
events.
A second clear aspect was Bohr highlighting that,
in quantum mechanics, if one experimental arrangement
permits the unambiguous use of the concept of position,
then a different arrangement is needed to permit such use
of the concept of momentum. For Bohr, a spacetime de-
scription meant determining the position of a system, but
causality was linked to the conservation of momentum.
Bohr characterized these twomodes of description, space-
time and causal, as complementary butmutually exclusive
[22, § 4.6.3][398, 407].
Thirdly, Bohr went on to suggest that any analysis of
phenomena combining such complementary descriptions,
is “in principle” excluded [408]. While this was clearly
Bohr’s view, both itsmeaning and its basis were unclear. It
maybe thatBohr’s philosophy rules out suchanalysis [396,
§ 2(b)], but a theory which is more descriptive of physical
systems in isolation than is quantummechanics remains a
possibility for those whose philosophy differs from Bohr’s.
In a similar way, a theory more descriptive of physical sys-
tems in isolation than is quantum mechanics remains a
possibility for those [409] whose assumptions differ from
those who deny such a possibility [410].
Another possible understanding is that Bohr was “in
principle” excluding only the possibility that a value could
be attributed to each quantum mechanical observable for
the system independently of measurement [22, § 4.2.2].
This is not necessarily inconsistent with the possibility of
a more fundamental theory underlying quantum mechan-
ics, and there is evidence that Bohr was open to that possi-
bility [22, § 4.2.2].
Some form of such analysis is certainly possible [22,
ch. 7][411]. Mathematically, it appears that in quantumme-
chanics, any such analysis cannot be exact (in the sense of
avoiding approximations) [412]. Even accepting this, nei-
ther logic, nor experiment, nor formalism, demand exclu-
sion “in principle”, even in a future theory, of a precise,
objective, ontic description of independent reality. Exper-
imental facts concern phenomena (system-apparatus in-
teractions), not isolated systems. Complementarity of con-
texts (of phenomena) does not imply complementarity of
properties (of systems) [185, Part 1]. Ontology may not be
observable [381, p. 25][413].
Thus a theory more descriptive of physical systems in
isolation than is quantum mechanics remains a possibil-
ity.
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6.2 De Broglie and Bohmian theories: more
descriptive but no less peculiar
So-called “hidden variable” theories were among the ear-
liest attempts to develop a theory more descriptive than
quantum mechanics. In such theories quantum mechan-
ical analysis prescribes only some aspects of future events
relating to the system, and the values of hidden variables
provide a physical description of systems in isolation [25].
The term hidden is potentially misleading: the values of
hidden variables are determinable in principle [53] and in
practice [414], but are “hidden” fromquantummechanical
prescription or control [22, § 10.3.4][151, § 3.3].
De Broglie’s 1927 pilot wave theory had distinctly non-
classical dynamics. Bohm then revived these dynamics
in a form which suggested to some that de Broglie-Bohm
theories reflected classical principles [268, ch. 11][415].
Bohm, however, used the term quantum nonmechanics
[387, § 2][416], emphasizing the non-classical nature of the
dynamics [219, 417].
Bohmian theories aim to describe a situation as it ex-
ists independently of observation [416], and so to allow
physics to describemind-independent reality (see Sect. 1.5
above). This viewof independent reality, however, appears
to be as hard to understand as is conventional quantum
mechanics [25, p. 160][387, § 2][417][418, p. 15][419].
For Bohm, a measurement event outcome was deter-
mined by hidden parameters for both apparatus and sys-
tem [420, § 5][421, § 5]. Bohm agreed with Bohr on the fun-
damental role of the measuring apparatus as an insepa-
rable part of the observed system (Sect. 6.1 above). Bohm
differed from Bohr, however, in allowing the role of the
apparatus to be analyzed, in principle, in a precise way
[56, § 5.3][420, § 9], consistent with the outline in Sect. 4.1
above. Bohm’s theory thus differs from the type ruled out
by vonNeumann’s earlier theorem, inwhichmeasurement
event outcomes depend only on the state for the system
[420, § 9]. There is ongoing debate on the merit or other-
wise of von Neumann’s earlier theorem [422, 423].
There is a range of approaches to Bohmian theories
[424] but most of them share the following five features.
1. The full description of a system combines the
state and the configuration of the system in three-
dimensional space [425].
2. Individual systems possess a definite position and
their subsequent positions are determined by a
quantumpotential or a velocity field. Their positions
are also guided by the state, which itself evolves ac-
cording to the Schrödinger equation, and there is
compatibility between this effect, and that of the
potential [425]. Individual systems do not necessar-
ily possess any properties other than position [50,
pp. 177–179][419, 426]. Similarly, systems do not nec-
essarily follow well-defined trajectories [200, § 6]
[254, 418]. Bohm suggested that what appears to be
a system might be series of events, so close one to
the other that they look like a continuously existing
system [387, § 2], in line with the possibility noted in
Sect. 2.1 above.
3. The main state is a composite system state, notion-
ally assigned to the known universe. The concept
of a state of the universe raises significant prac-
tical and conceptual difficulties [427, 428]. These
difficulties have limited effect on the application
of Bohmian theories, however, because only condi-
tional or effective states are associated with the sys-
tems under analysis [219, 239, 428, 429]. Referring
to Sect. 3.7 above, relative to the notional composite
system state, the effective state corresponds to a re-
duceddensitymatrix for the (sub)systemunder anal-
ysis [430, § 3]. An important assumption in these the-
ories is that, at some time, there is a random distri-
bution of the positions of the systems under anal-
ysis, with respect to the relevant composite state.
This assumption is known as the distribution pos-
tulate or the quantum equilibrium hypothesis [56,
§ 5.1.2][414, 425].
4. The guiding field in mathematical space has conse-
quences in physical space [431–433]. An example is
the Bohmian explanation of the two-slit experiment
(Sect. 5.1) [268, § 6.1.1][434]. In some versions, the
state (or guiding field) features in a physical law,
rather than as part of independent reality [239, 428],
although making this distinction is not necessarily
straightforward [219]. In other versions, the state re-
flects properties of the systems [435]. In a third ap-
proach, both systems and state are ontological [228].
This raises the challenges common to all attempts to
link quantummechanical states to ontic states, as re-
ferred to at the end of Sect. 3.4 above. In a Bohmian
context, however, there are more grounds for the
ontological state to exist in conventional spacetime
(rather than in a much higher dimensional realm),
for example as a physical multi-field [230, 231].
5. Bohmian theories generally make only statistical
predictions and so empirically verifying these pre-
scriptions is almost always statistical, in the same
way as it is for other approaches to quantum me-
chanics (see Sect. 2.1 above). The conceptually dif-
ferent feature of Bohmian theories is that the statis-
tical character of the predictions is accepted as be-
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ing attributable to a lack of knowledge [50, § 5.6][56,
§ 5.1.2][436]. That said, there is not consensus on
how probabilities are to be interpreted in this con-
text [437]. The predictions of Bohmian theories for
the collective outcomes of any experiment are gen-
erally held to agree with all unambiguous quantum
mechanics predictions [50, § 5.1][414, 425]. This view
has been defended against various challenges [438],
although these continue to arise [439, 440]. There is
ongoing experimental work to explore how modify-
ing the assumptions might lead to results which de-
viate from quantummechanics [421]. Consideration
of measurement in the context of Bohmian theories
requires care for two reasons. (a) As noted above,
measurement outcomes depend on both the appa-
ratus and the system and so the result of a posi-
tionmeasurementwill in general not reveal the posi-
tion of the system prior tomeasurement [22, § 10.3.4].
(b) A full measurement analysis of a composite [S
+ A], as outlined in Sect. 4.3 above, in terms of any
Bohmian theory would be so complicated that, in
practice, it might be impossible [193].
The Bohmian approach illustrates that it is possible to
develop a theory more descriptive of physical systems in
isolation than is quantummechanics. It also provides a for-
malism which allows classical hydrodynamic techniques
to be used in quantum mechanical analysis, regardless of
whether or not that formalism is understood in terms of a
Bohmian theory with the above characteristics [441].
6.3 Relative state interpretations: applying
the formalism to closed systems
The relative state interpretationwasdeveloped in response
to the need (outlined in Sect. 3.1 above) to apply quantum
mechanics to closed systems [442].
In this approach [442], any system that is subject to ex-
ternal observation is treated as part of a larger (composite)
isolated (unobserved) system. Any state assigned to a sub-
system of this composite system corresponds to a unique
relative state for the remainder of the composite system. In
ameasurement, the apparatus,A,which interactswith sys-
tem, S, is a subsystem in the larger isolated [S+A] system.
In each single run of measurement, the A state branches
into several different states. Each branch represents a dif-
ferent measurement event outcome, and the correspond-
ing relative state for S. All branches exist simultaneously;
Everett’s original paper does not directly link branches to
independent reality, partly due to the challenge of finding
appropriate non-mathematical language [443].
The a quantum mechanical state is mathematical
(Sect. 3.1 above). Assuming that a system is an aspect of
independent reality, a relative state interpretation must,
therefore, supplement the formalism in some way, or as-
sume that the mathematical state describes physical facts
[1, 171, 444].
– Most relative state interpretations involve some com-
bination of explicitly adding worlds to the formal-
ism, or invoking intrinsic properties of the mind,
or using decoherence theory (Sect. 4.4 above) [56,
§ 5.2][445].
– A combination of the first and third of these ap-
proaches may be consistent with determinism [446].
– In other suggested approaches, branches are factual
and counterfactual descriptions of one world [447],
or differing trajectories, in spacetime, of point-like
elements with a local internal memory [448].
Relative state interpretations take the terms in the
mathematical state to be branches, and so to be outcomes.
There are many ways to expand a composite system state
(whether pure or mixed) as a combination of other states
(see Sects. 3.3 and 3.5 above). Everett’s approach focused,
for a given observable, on an expansion such that, for
each term in the expansion, the observable has a definite
value. There are, however, possible expansions in which
the observable has, for any term in the expansion, an indef-
inite value. How does the relative state approach link such
expansions to measurement events? For some, no link is
needed [447, § 4]. Others invoke decoherence in this con-
text [260, 449, 450]. It might seem inappropriate to apply
extrinsic decoherence (based on the effect on [S+A] of a
wider environment E) in a relative state approach (which
treats [S+A] as a closed system) [451], but the use of intrin-
sic decoherence seems legitimate (see Sect. 4.4 above). The
use of decoherence in this context has, however, been chal-
lenged on other grounds [452].
Understanding probability is a particular challenge
in relative state interpretations, regardless of which ap-
proach to probability (see Sect. 1.7 above) is taken.
– How can a measurement event outcome be uncer-
tain, if all the components (of the expansion rel-
evant for that measurement type) exist? One sug-
gested approach is that, in the context of a world
which branches, an agent is uncertain about which
branch that agent will be in after branching. Alter-
natively, in the context of a multiverse of possible
worlds (none of which branch), an agent is uncer-
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tain about which world that agent is in [453]. The
concept of branching time (or spacetime)may be rel-
evant [454, 455].
– Why is that uncertainty quantified according to the
formalism? There is disagreement over whether or
not the quantummechanics probability rules can be
derived (in this context) in a decision theoretic ap-
proach [444, 456–459].
– Can probabilities be empirically confirmed? The co-
herence of empirical verification is also unresolved
[161, 459–461][462, § 4].
Relative state approaches illustrate challenges which
arise through treating the mathematical formalism as di-
rectly relating to ontic states of systems [170, § 2]. These
issues are in addition to those outlined in Sect. 3.4 above.
6.4 Time-symmetric approaches: is this
challenging concept helpful?
Is there a substantial difference between the two temporal
directions: towards past and towards future [463]? There
are logical, epistemological and general scientific objec-
tions to any such difference [464], with differing views on
their validity [465–467]. In the specific context of quantum
mechanics, features such as those explored in Sects. 5.2
to 5.6 above, suggest some combination of time symmetry
[468, 469], reverse causality [88, § 5.2][470–472], an ady-
namical spacetime [222], or a three dimensional timeless
space [473].
In the context of an already ambiguous role of time
in quantum mechanics (Sect. 1.6 above), these possibili-
ties raise significant challenges for understanding it (in
the sense outlined in Sect. 1.2 above). These challenges
are illustrated by three time-symmetric approaches: the
transactional interpretation, the consistent histories ap-
proaches, and the two-time, two-state approach.
1. The transactional interpretation aims to provide an
observer-free account of measurement [172]. It as-
sumes that an emitter sends an offer wave, possible
absorbers each receive part of it, and send confirma-
tion waves, backwards in time, to the emitter, which
chooses one of them as the initial basis for a transac-
tion. Repeated emitter-absorber wave exchanges, in
both time directions, develop a spacetime standing
wave to complete the transaction.
This fitswellwith some features of themathematical
formalism, but raises significant conceptual chal-
lenges. For example, the nature of the waves is ei-
ther “somewhat ephemeral” in ordinary space [474],
or ontological in an “extraspatiotemporal domain of
quantum possibility.” [123, § 6][475]. Despite such
challenges, there are ongoing suggestions that this
approach makes a positive contribution to under-
standing quantum mechanics [200, § 4][253][387,
§ 3][476].
2. The consistent histories formalism only assigns
probabilities to consistent sets of histories [477].
A set of histories, or sequences of measurement
events, is consistent if there is a single probability
space accommodating themall. Such sample spaces
are referred to as frameworks [198, 478].
True and false are understood relative to a frame-
work [479]. This in itself is conceptually challeng-
ing. It requires accepting that there is not a unique,
universally true state of affairs. Reasoning must be
done in a single framework: incompatible frame-
works must not be combined. All frameworks are
equally valid, varying only in their usefulness [328],
but some propose restricting the valid frameworks
[480], or amending the formalism [477].
The histories approach claims to be compatible with
the ideaof independent reality [203], but is criticized
as adding little description of that reality [477, 481,
482].
3. The two-time, two-state approach limits the ontol-
ogy of a system to those properties which, in a mea-
surement event, have a definite outcome [305].
Each system is represented by two quantum me-
chanical states, one evolving forwards in time, the
other backwards in time, in a two-state formalism
which has been separately developed [483].
Measurement event outcomes reflect the combina-
tion of the post-measurement state (evolving back-
wards in time) and the pre-measurement state
(evolving forwards in time). This analysis implies
effects which might underlie apparent paradoxes
in quantum mechanics [484, 485]. To the extent
that this explains measurement event outcomes by
knowing what those outcomes are, it contributes lit-
tle to understanding quantummechanics [486, § 4].
To explain some measurement event outcomes, the
two-time, two-state approach refers to the future
state of the known universe [483], which also seems
of limited explanatory value [486, § 5].
These three approaches illustrate that introducing the
concept of time symmetry into quantum mechanics is it-
self a challenge to satisfactorily understand, might gener-
ate further challenges to understanding, and might not re-
duce some of the existing challenges.
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6.5 Spontaneous collapse theories: closed
systems and conceptual anomalies
Spontaneous collapse theories focus on closed systems
(see Sect. 3.1 above). These theories are intrinsically in-
deterministic: systems possess an irreducible disposition
to spontaneously reach a definite value of position [487,
488] or energy [204]. Collapse theories use a modified
Schrödinger equation so that the state suffers either an oc-
casional hit leading to a spontaneous collapse [489], or is
continuously driven towards such a collapse [490]. This
can be seen as equivalent to the practical application of
an unmodified Schrödinger equation in realistic situations
[491]. The collapse involves the disappearance of the in-
terference terms (see Sects. 3.5 and 3.6 above) in superpo-
sition and entangled states [106]. Collapse theories thus
achieve similar results to those of quantum statistical me-
chanics (outlined in Sect. 4.3 above), but by a different
method [270].
The details of the modifications leading to collapse
are such that quantum mechanical states for simple sys-
tems follow Schrödinger evolution almost all the time, but
states for large systems have frequent collapses [489, 490].
This account allows, in principle, the application of quan-
tum mechanics to closed, unobserved systems (although
there is a sense in which a collapse without an apparatus
performing a measurement can only be hypothetical). It
also, in practice, accounts for single measurement event
outcomes. In collapse theories, probabilities relate to fu-
ture events and interactions among physical systems, re-
gardless of whether or not such events and interactions in-
volve any notion of measurement [106, § 2]. When, in prac-
tice, collapse theories are applied to measurements, the
apparatus is treated as any other system would be [487,
§ 6.5]. The predictions of spontaneous collapse theories
match those of quantum mechanics for all experiments
which are currently feasible. Some predictions of sponta-
neous collapse theories do diverge from those of quantum
mechanics but, to date, no tests have been able to explore
these limits [319, 492].
The state featuring in collapse theories appears to be
informationally complete, in the sense that it is directly
linked tophysical independent reality.Oneapproach takes
the state as representing all there is [53, § 2]. The more
common approach adds an additional ontology to the core
principles of collapse theories [1, 228, 269], or at least rec-
ognizes that some such ontology is implied by the state
[493, 494].
Either way, some challenges arise. With or without
an added or implied ontology, collapse theories must link
events to the mathematical state. Such links are almost
always fuzzy: different physical events relate to arbitrar-
ily similar mathematical states [495]. Fuzzy links imply
that some probabilities prescribed by the mathematical
state are ignored [62, § 4.3]. Such ignored probabilities are
known as tails [496].
The question arises of how to treat an overlap of tails
relating to states representing distinct physical systems.
Depending on the treatment of such tails, it has been sug-
gested that a range of anomalies can arise [62, § 4.3]. The
counter-suggestion is that the anomalies arise only from
an implied, inappropriate, understanding of probabilities
prescribed by the state as relating to measurement events
[487, § 11]. As noted above, probabilities in collapse the-
ories relate only to future events and interactions among
closed systems.
For those who accept the existence of anomalies, link-
ing the state to a mass (or matter) density is claimed to
avoid some of them [431, 497], but this is disputed [496].
An alternative takes only the collapses as representing the
distribution of matter [498]: collapses are events at space-
time points and macroscopic objects are galaxies of such
events [488][499, § 3]. This is in line with the possibility,
noted in Sect. 2.1 above, that systemsmay be comprised of
discrete events, rather than continually existing.
Even with anomalies, interpretations based on fuzzy
or mass links can be maintained by modifying other as-
sumptions [62, § 4.3][489, 495, 496]. Likewise, the event-
based view is challenging but not necessarily incoherent
[174, 500].
Collapse theories provide further evidence that a the-
ory more descriptive of physical systems in isolation than
is quantum mechanics is possible. Such theories also fur-
ther illustrate the conceptual anomalies and challenges
which can arise in linking a quantum mechanical formal-
ism to independent reality.
6.6 Information-based approaches: insights
on formalisms, few on reality
As noted in Sect. 2.1 and 3.2 above, the quantum mechan-
ical formalism rarely describes individual physical sys-
tems, but generally prescribes only particular aspects of
expected future events relating to physical systems. These
features of the formalism, and similarities between it and
theories of information and probability, suggest a range of
possibilities.
– Quantum mechanics might reflect a limit on the
amount of knowledge one can have about any sys-
tem [112, 176, 210, 501–504].
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– It might result from the constraints of algebraic and
order-theoretic symmetries [505].
– It might reflect a limit on copying information [506]
– It might be such as to allow for maximal control of
randomness [507].
– Itmight be a new type of probability theory [127, 508,
509].
Some suggest that quantum mechanics can be under-
stood in terms of properties of information sources and
communication channels in nature, rather than in terms
of ontological features that give rise to these information-
theoretic properties [506, 510].
Several questions remain unanswered by a purely
information-based approach to understanding quantum
mechanics [511, 512].
– What physically supports the information [176,
§ 3(a)][513, § 4]?
– How does this view apply to an apparatus [16,
§ 8][514, § 4.2]?
– How can quantummechanics be assessed [515, § 6]?
– How can independent reality behave for quantum
mechanics to be true [6, 35]?
One response to this last question is QBism [112], one
formof quantumBayesianism. InQBism, physical systems
are real and independent of us and some features of the
formalism (other than the state) may reveal aspects of in-
dependent reality [112, 171, 510, 516]. The state, however, is
merely an expression of subjective information about the
consequences of the quantum mechanics user’s interven-
tions into nature [516]. There is no true state [516, fn. i].
Quantum mechanical states are subjective [112, § III], one
form of Bayesian probabilities (see Sect. 1.7 above): epis-
temic and personalist [112] rather than logical [103, § 4].
The question of how an information-theoretic based
approach can be linked to independent reality has also
prompted some other responses [216].
– ‘Properties’ in quantum mechanics can be viewed
as descriptions of how one system influences oth-
ers, rather than attributes possessed by the system
[314, 505].
– An information-based principle theory may reflect
an underlying constructive theory [216], of the type
outlined in Sect. 6.7 below.
– Quantum information theory can be linked with a
relational view, based on structural realism, of the
type mentioned in Sect. 6.9 below.
– Quantum mechanics may be a theory which re-
flects ontic andepistemic three-way connections, be-
tween a user of the theory, a physical system, and
the information available to the user [396, 517].
– A device-independent approach suggests that quan-
tum mechanics is not about physical systems but,
rather, about how the structure of language is con-
strained by physical independent reality [16].
Overall, information-based approaches havemade sig-
nificant progress in identifying and highlighting features
which the quantum mechanical formalism shares with in-
formation theory. Such approaches have, to date, made far
less progress on identifying what the formalism might in-
dicate about the nature of (agent) independent reality.
6.7 Prequantum classical theories: a more
descriptive theory may be possible
Classical theories are being developed which aim to more
fully describe physical systems, as they exist independent
of measurement. Most of these theories relate to a pre-
quantum, or submicroscopic, level of independent reality,
which is assumed to underlie phenomena dealt with by
quantum mechanics, and which may be deterministic or
indeterministic.
These theories illustrate that phenomena (sys-
tem/apparatus interactions) which require quantum me-
chanical analysis are not necessarily inconsistent with
systems (and apparatus) which are adequately described
by classical physics.
1. In prequantumclassical statistical field theory quan-
tum statistics emerge from a stochastic field ana-
lyzed in a classical probability space [213, 345, 518].
All the predictions of quantum mechanics are re-
produced, including those for an entangled system
[518]. Other predictions, beyond those of quantum
mechanics, are being experimentally explored [272,
519].
Related developments include two similar models:
one based on particles, rather than fields [520], and
the other deterministic, rather than stochastic [521].
Not directly related but similar approaches include
one based on the interaction of a signal wave with
a carrier wave [522], and another based on a retro-
causal constraining of a classical field [523].
2. The cellular automaton interpretation assumes a
systemof cellswith classical deterministic evolution
equations for each cell, which only depend on the
data in the adjacent cells [159, p. 51].
The classical laws represented by these equations
give strong correlations over vast distances, prevent
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any action inconsistent with these, and so create a
link between the resetting of ameasuringdevice and
widely-separated ontic states [159, § 5.7.3].
In this approach, sub-microscopic states are onto-
logical, but quantum mechanical states are non-
ontological templates to deal with microscopic phe-
nomena. Due to the correlations, measurement
event outcomes need be determined only for factual
measurements, not for many counterfactual alter-
natives. Measurement confirms that the observable
measured has (and had) an ontological state, and
some other observables do (and did) not [159, § 4.2,
§ 5.4, § 5.5].
Prototype automata exist for quantum mechanics
with interactions, and with composite systems [524].
3. Digital mechanics represents an alternative route to
explore the possibility of a discrete, deterministic,
prequantum process [525, 526].
4. Other approaches also assume a exact theory under-
lying quantum mechanics [342, 527–530]. Some of
these [531, 532] stress the importance of the system-
apparatus interaction (see Sect. 4.1 above).
5. A radically different approach has shown that many
of the so-called quantum phenomena can be de-
scribed,without quantization ofmatter and light, by
considering both light and electrons as continuous
classical fields [533].
6.8 Subensembles, quantum measures and
alternative formalisms
Some further approaches arise out of specific mathemati-
cal analyses of quantummechanics.
1. The subensemble based approach [23], limits phys-
ical interpretation of the formalism to apparatus
readings. This approach [23, 193] is consistent with
the analysis outlined in Parts 2 and 4 above. It uses
uses quantum statistical mechanics to analyze the
interaction process between A and S, as briefly out-
lined at the end of Sect. 4.3 above.
The approach restricts the extent to which the ab-
stract probabilities in the formalism are linked to
independent reality. These probabilities are inter-
preted as relative frequencies of runs, but only to
the extent that they relate to subensembles charac-
terized by specific outcomes. It can thus explain how
awell-defined outcome emerges in a single run from
a formalism which deals only with ensembles, and
howdifferent single runs, from one initial state, may
have different outcomes.
The subensemble based approach, therefore, illus-
trates a way to link the formalism to independent
reality, without the difficulties (see Sect. 3.4 above)
of fully identifying the state with that reality.
It also highlights the value of the precise use of non-
mathematical language (Sects. 1.1 and 1.3 above).
For example it crucially depends on distinctions
among different understandings of probability (Sect.
1.7 above) intended at each stage, and the distinc-
tion between mathematical objects and expected
measurement event outcomes [23].
2. The quantum measure approach suggests that the
concept of histories may be more fundamental than
that of states [86]. This approach considers general-
ized stochastic processes, analyzed by reference to
spacetime histories. This approach to quantum me-
chanics does not depend on the notion of measure-
ment.
A central question in this approach is ‘what corre-
sponds to thephysicalworld?’One suggestion is that
the physical world is represented by an answer to ev-
ery yes-nophysical question that canbe asked about
the world, once the class of spacetime histories has
been fixed [534].
3. Other mathematically based approaches arise from
the use of alternative formalisms. These include ap-
proaches based on multiple trajectories [191, 535],
category theory [536] and topos theory [79, 109][188,
§ 2, § 5].
6.9 Other useful frameworks: modal,
relational and logical approaches
Three other approaches to the formalism can be helpful.
1. In modal interpretations [102, 537–540], the quan-
tum mechanical state (a) refers to a single system
whichpossesses physical properties at all times, and
(b) represents what may be the case (modalities):
which properties the system may possess.
In contrast, the value state represents what is the
case: the physical properties the system possesses.
Measurement events are ordinary physical inter-
actions, definite outcomes are predicted, and out-
comes reflect apparatus properties.
Conceptual challenges arise [263, § 3][537]: one
modal approach involves ontological propensities
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[541]; another proposes that the realm of possibility
is as real as that of actuality [102][123, § 5].
Unlike the approach taken in this review, modal ap-
proaches relate the quantum state to a single system,
rather than to an ensemble of system/apparatus in-
teractions.
Bohmian and relative state approaches can be seen
as types of modal interpretation [538].
2. Quantummechanics is relational [176, 482, 502, 542,
543]. A state prescribes probabilities for interactions
between a system and other systems, such as an ap-
paratus (see Sect. 3.2 above). This is one reason to
consider state and value as relational notions [103,
§ 4][176, 180, 482].
Asnotedabove, Sect. 4.1, collective outcomesarenot
ascribed to systems, nor to apparatus, but to the to-
tality [167, app. C]. This is analogous to structural re-
alism, in which relations do not require relata hav-
ing intrinsic identity [222, 269], but it is unclear pre-
ciselyhowquantummechanics links to structural re-
alism [544][545, § 4.2].
More generally, the implications of the relational
view for independent reality are neither clear nor
straightforward [546, 547]. Some relational views in-
volve a sparse ontology of discrete events happen-
ing at interactions between what are assumed to be
physical systems, rather than a fuller ontology, of
permanent systems that have well defined proper-
ties at each moment of a continuous time [176].
Care is, however, needed in applying relational anal-
ysis to quantum mechanics. For example, being en-
tangled is not a relational property [73, 244]. Be-
ing entangled is a feature of a composite system
state, due to the composite being treated as one
system (see Sect. 3.6 above). Reduced density ma-
trices can represent subsystems of a composite sys-
tem, but such matrices correspond to separate, non-
entangled, states for the systems treated separately
(see Sect. 3.7 above).
A relational approach to an entangled state would
allow for three different accounts: one dealing with
the interaction of the whole composite system and
another system external to it, and the other two deal-
ing, for each subsystem, with the interaction of that
subsystem and another system interacting onlywith
that subsystem [50, § 7.1.2].
3. Specific logical frameworks and analyses can
– highlight features of the formalism [548],
– contribute to understanding how that formal-
ism relates to independent reality [481, 549],
and
– assess whether or not quantum mechanics
necessarily requires new notions of truth
[550–554].
Modal, relational and logical analyses provide useful
tools to explore, separately or with other approaches, the
characteristics of quantummechanics.
7 Summary of main findings
Quantum mechanics in general prescribes only regulari-
ties among multiple measurement events. This suggests
the possibility that events, rather than systems, may form
the fundamental ontology of independent reality.
Statistical balance is a core (but unexplained) feature
of quantummechanics.
– The collective response of an ensemble of identically
prepared systems, to differing measurement types,
is intricately balanced.
– For example, the empirical data rarely justify a
claim that each member of the ensemble was, pre-
measurement, such that a definite value could be at-
tributed to the measured property.
The following comprehensive characterization of a
quantum mechanical state can be synthesized from ele-
ments of various analyses.
– A state prescribes, in probability terms, aspects of
expected events relating to an ensemble of systems,
in a range of possible situations.
– Such situations include the systems remaining
closed, and also include the systems interacting
with other systems (such as with a measuring appa-
ratus, or a wider environment).
– For measurement, the state prescribes probability
distributions, which reflect the statistical balance
in collective outcomes, both within ensembles, and
among ensembles for differing measurement types.
This characterization can, in principle, apply to sys-
tems which either are not, or cannot be, observed. It high-
lights, however, that quantum mechanics deals with real-
ity independent of human thought in only a very limited
way, and does not necessarily describe intrinsic features
of the physical systems to which it is applied.
This characterization also yields helpful perspectives
on pure states, entanglement, and measurement.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 1/6/20 7:51 PM
Understanding quantum mechanics: review, synthesis | 421
– For a pure state, the relevant ensemble is such that
any subensemble is represented by that same state.
– Entanglement is merely a more complex form of sta-
tistical balance, here relating to measurements of
more than one observable, on different subsystems,
for a composite system represented by a single state.
– This in turn, through decoherence theory, allows
quantum mechanical analysis to extend to the envi-
ronment of themeasurement, and to closed systems.
Extrinsic decoherence theory shows how interference
terms can becomenegligible. Quantum statisticalmechan-
ics shows how the other terms reach thermal equilibrium.
This solves the measurement problem: it explains how a
well-defined outcome may emerge in a single run from a
formalism which deals only with ensembles.
There is no obvious way to formally apply the quan-
tum mechanics uncertainty relations to an individual sys-
tem, in terms of values assigned to observables, or proper-
ties possessed.
A theory more descriptive of independent reality than
is quantum mechanics may yet be possible. The Bell and
Bell-Kochen-Specker analyses do not necessarily rule out
such theories, given the lack of consensus on their inter-
pretation. There are many approaches to the pursuit of a
more descriptive theory.
Bohr’s approach dealt only with events. Bohmian ap-
proaches deal with systems and stress the fundamental
role of the apparatus.
Significant challenges arise in any attempt to directly
link the formalism to the ontic states of closed physical
systems, as illustrated by relative state interpretations and
spontaneous collapse theories.
Other approaches involve a less direct link.
– Time-symmetric approaches involve additional chal-
lenging concepts.
– Information-based approaches provide limited in-
sight on independent reality.
– Prequantum approaches explore the scope for clas-
sical theories underlying the formalism.
– Further approaches arise directly from the mathe-
matics of alternative formalisms.
– Modal, relational and logical frameworks offer use-
ful analytic tools.
Physics might, in principle, be able to more fully de-
scribe independent reality. A first step in the pursuit of
that possibility is to reach a greater degree of consensus,
among both physicists and philosophers, on how to under-
stand quantummechanics. This review has
– concentrated on the conceptual, not the mathemati-
cal, aspects of undertanding quantummechanics,
– used non-mathematical language with precision,
and
– aimed to reflect enough of the literature to be rep-
resentative of the current state of undertanding in
quantummechanics.
In these ways, this review contributes to achieving that
greater consensus, and so to that pursuit.
8 Glossary: intended meanings for
some non-mathematical terms
As noted in Sect. 1.1 above, understanding quantum me-
chanics is hard, because many pre-quantum mechani-
cal, concepts and word meanings may need to be modi-
fied, and such understanding will be even harder if non-
mathematical language is not used precisely.
This glossary therefore clarifies the intendedmeaning
of some of the non-mathematical terms used in this review.
For each of these terms, the glossary either specifies a non-
mathematical meaning, or notes that no single meaning
need be chosen. Terms in italics have their own glossary
entries.
Bohmian relating to the approach suggested by de
Broglie and developed by Bohm; see Sect. 6.2
causal generally defined relative to a specific theoret-
ical model [555][556, § 3][557, § 4]; causal notions are not
necessarily needed to achieve understanding [38]; even
where they are invoked, there is no consensus on how cau-
sation is to be defined [327][558, § 2][559]
coherence (for waves) the absence of spatial disper-
sion; (for superposition states) the existence of interference
terms [234]; (for entangled states) statistical balance in col-
lective outcomes, among ensembles for measurements of
differing observables on multiple subsystems [235, § 2.3]:
see Sects. 3.5 and 3.6
completeness feature of a theory with terms which
specify all the properties of a system [53]
contextuality generally defined relative to one
specific approach to quantum mechanics [328, § V.E][371];
broadly, assignment of values depends on the relevant
measurement process [306]; see Sect. 5.7
counterfactual (formal) a subjunctive conditional
sentence, whose antecedent is contrary-to-fact [558]; (in-
formal) relating to circumstances being other than as they
are [30]; a complex area [327]
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decoherence absence of coherence; the disappear-
ance of the interference terms in a density matrix represent-
ing a superposition state; see Sect. 4.4
densitymatrix amatrix, with specificmathematical
characteristics, over a Hilbert space
determinism implies that any possible group of
systems (which are isolated from any other systems) will
evolve in a single uniqueway from any possible initial con-
ditions [138]; ontological determinism implies that deter-
minism is a feature of independent reality; epistemic deter-
minism implies that determinism is a feature of our knowl-
edge of independent reality; see Sect. 1.9
empirical relating to phenomena collectively
entangled state superposition of composite system
pure states; implies statistical balance in collective out-
comes, among ensembles formeasurements of differing ob-
servables on different subsystems; see Sect. 3.6
ensemble statistical ensemble
epistemic refers to the ways in which humans ac-
quire knowledge and process information [25, p. 57][233]
ergodicity the coincidence of time and ensemble av-
erages in empirical data [337, 338]
event several meanings are possible [174, § 2]; this
review will take event to mean the instantiation of one or
more properties within some region of spacetime
field specification of properties smoothly across
spacetime [25, p. 57]
formalism one of several mathematical structures,
in which analysis in quantum mechanics can be carried
out; examples include Hilbert spaces, Fock spaces [560],
quasi-sets [560], Dirac brackets [277, § 5], Feynman path
amplitudes [128, § 1], multiple trajectories [191, 535] and
algebraic theories [561] such as category theory [536] and
topos theory [79, 109][188, § 2, § 5].
hidden variables variables, other than those spec-
ified by the quantum mechanical formalism, which some
approaches to quantum mechanics assume are needed to
entirely specify the ontic state; see Sect. 6.2
Hilbert space a mathematical vector space, usually
with many more than 3 dimensions; one of the formalisms
[25, ch. 2]
incompleteness lack of completeness
independent reality that which exists other than
only in human thought; see Sect. 1.5
interference the combined effect of the effects of sev-
eral waves; typically features regions where these effects
cancel each other [24, p. 131]
interference terms in a superposition state, terms
representing, notmeasurement event outcomes but, rather,
statistical balance in collective outcomes, among ensem-
bles for differingmeasurement types; see Sect. 3.5
intrinsic decoherence disappearance of interfer-
ence terms in a coarse-grained approximate mathematical
analysis of a closed system (notionally) split into an open
subsystem and an ignored residual subsystem; see Sect.
4.4
locality no single definition; usually implies some
limitation on the extent to which one system or measure-
ment event can influence, link to, or affect, another spa-
tially separated system or measurement event; see Sects.
5.4 to 5.6; occasionally may be given a temporal meaning
[88]
matter particles,waves or fields singly or collectively
measurement dynamical process in which appara-
tus A is repeatedly coupled to successive members, S, of
an ensemble of systems to explore all possible values of a
joint property of S andA; the result is ascribed to thewhole
closed phenomenon; see Sect. 4.1
measurement event single run of ameasurement
mind no single definition is assumed
mixed state a state for which the relevant ensemble
can be split, such that each subensemble is represented by
a different pure state; see Sect. 3.3
multi-field specifies properties, smoothly across
spacetime, by reference to multiple points in spacetime
[230, 231]; see Sect. 3.4
object that which is being studied, discussed or ex-
amined
objective relating to an independent reality [49];
what is objective should not depend on the particular per-
spective used for the description [63, § 3.1]
observables operators associated with properties re-
lating to the studied system [193, 300]
observe to use physics concepts to account for what
is done or thought about a measurement; to describe a
measurement by associating data [562, 563]
ontic state a complete specification of the properties
of a system (in an ontologicalmodel) [212]; see Sect. 3.4
ontology/ontological structures postulated in a
physical theory as primary, underlying, explanatory enti-
ties [78, 564] to account for the existence of events [500];
can be seen as forming the basis for kinematics (all pos-
sible values and arrangements of the physical ontology)
and dynamics (specific constraints on how the ontology
evolves in time) [430]; alternatively can be based on the
dynamics [494, § 2]; often expressed in terms of the nature
and behaviour of systems as they are [564], independent of
any empirical access [233]
operator map associating every vector in a Hilbert
space with another such vector [25, p. 37]
outcome apparatus reading for a single run of amea-
surement; collectively form the result of ameasurement
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particle entity associated with a group of spatially
localized properties, some of which are unchanging [25,
§ 4.2]; possibly has self-identity [17, 388, 565]
phenomenon observation linked to specified circum-
stances, including (where appropriate) the experimental
set-up [404, p. 64][405, § 3.3]
prepare/preparation (of a system): selection of
some of the single runs of ameasurement [193]
pre-quantum mechanical developed prior to the
experimental exploration of subatomic phenomena
prequantum relating to a level of independent reality
which is assumed to underlie the phenomena dealt with by
quantum mechanics; see Sect. 6.7
prescribe to specify (or, literally, write) in advance
property the values of some specified class of phys-
ical quantities lying in specified ranges [25, § 4.2]; may re-
late to a system considered in isolation but, in quantumme-
chanics, usually relates jointly to the system and either an
apparatus or a wider environment [563, 566]
pure state a state for which the relevant ensemble is
such that any subensemble of that ensemble is represented
by the same state; see Sect. 3.3
quanta particle-like concept in quantum theory, par-
ticularly quantum field theory; see Sect. 5.8
quantum field theory quantum theory dealing with
phenomena described in the integrated spacetime of spe-
cial relativity; see Sect. 1.6
quantummechanics one or more of the formalisms
ofquantum theory, excludinganyparts of those formalisms
specific to quantum field theory
quantum theory group of theories developed in re-
sponse to the exploration of subatomicphenomena, but, in
this review, excluding the theories, mentioned in Sect. 1.6,
which seek to incorporate general relativity.
realism any view which considers the notion of in-
dependent realitymeaningful; see Sect. 1.5
reduced density matrix density matrix related to
a subsystem of a composite system; gives probabilities for
outcomes ofmeasurements restricted to the subsystem; not
a state adequately representing the subsystem in the con-
text of the wider composite system, but a coarse-graining
of the composite state; see Sect. 3.7
relative state the approach outlined in Sect. 6.3
result collective outcomes of ameasurement
Schrödinger equation an equation specifying how
the quantum state evolves in time [25, § 6.4]
selection using single run outcomes to split an ensem-
ble into subensembles, eachwith one value of the relevant
observable [193]
self-identity feature of an entity for which different
instances of it can be distinguished, like currency coins
(and unlike currency in a bank account) [567, § 8]; the
extent to which quanta have self-identity is unresolved
[17][56, ch. 3][374, 376, 384, 388, 565, 568]
single run (in measurement): one system (from an
ensemble) interactingwith an apparatus, followed by read-
ing of an outcome [193]; see Sect. 4.1
state mathematical termwhich prescribes, generally
in terms of probability distributions, aspects of expected
future events relating to a statistical ensemble of systems
in a range of possible situations; see Sect. 3.2
statistical balance sense in which, for some com-
binations of measurement types, the collective response,
of a statistical ensemble of systems, to differing measure-
ment types, is intricately balanced, as reflected in empir-
ical data confirming probabilities prescribed by quantum
mechanics; see Sect. 2.2
statistical ensemble a set of systems which can be
treated as identical, such as those prepared in an identical
way [193]
subensemble part of a statistical ensemblewhich is
itself a statistical ensemble [193]
superposition a mathematical combination of pure
states to form another pure state; see Sect. 3.5
system an objectwhich can be isolated well enough,
and specified clearly enough, to allow it to be studied
[25, 566]; in this review, system is used extensively as an
alternative towave, particle, field or object, to avoid conno-
tations of such concepts in classical physics or general in-
tuition,whichmaynot be appropriate in quantummechan-
ics; care is still needed to avoid some remaining unhelpful
connotations, and limitations [569], of the word system it-
self [16]; likewise intuitive connotations of subsystemmay
also be unhelpful [570]; systemsmay be thought of as com-
prised of discrete events, rather than having a continuous
existence [174, 176]
wave a fieldwhich evolves in time and exhibits char-
acteristic behaviour such as interference
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